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Sensor networks are dense wireless networks constituting of small and low-
cost sensors that collect and disseminate sensory data. They have gained great 
attention in recent years due to their ability to offer economical and effective solutions 
in a variety of fields; and their profound suitability to address mission critical 
problems that are common in health, transportation, and military applications. “Sensor 
networks” is a technology that is seen to change the world, and as such their 
deployment is expected to see a rapid growth.  
Effective security strategy is essential for any sensor network in order to 
maintain trustful and reliable functionality, protect sensory information, and ensure 
network component authenticity. Security models and protocols that are typically 
used in other types of networks, such as wired networks, are not suitable for sensor 
networks due to their specific hardware specifications.  
This thesis highlights some of the research done so far in the area of security 
of wireless sensor networks and proposes a solution to detect Byzantine behaviour - a 
challenging security threat that many sensor networks face. The proposed solution’s 
use of cryptography is kept at a minimum to ensure maximum secure bandwidth.  
Under this solution, a sensor network continues to work normally until an 
attack is suspected. Once an attack is suspected, a cryptography scheme is enabled to 
authenticate suspected nodes and to allow the identification of potential external 
attacks. If an attack seems to persist after the cryptography scheme has been enabled, 
the same mechanism is used to identify and isolate potentially compromised nodes. 
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The goal is to introduce a degree of intelligence into such networks and consequently 
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1CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Sensor networks” is a term used to refer to a heterogeneous system combining 
tiny sensors and actuators with general/special-purpose processors. Sensor networks 
are assumed to grow in size to include hundreds or thousands of low-power, low-cost, 
static or mobile nodes.  
Sensor networks are useful in a variety of fields, including environmental 
monitoring, military surveillance, and information gathering from inhospitable places. 
They not only monitor but also facilitate control of physical environments from 
remote locations. Sensors play important roles in various applications: measuring 
flow, temperature, humidity, pressure, brightness, mechanical stress, and proximity. 
Areas such as disaster anticipation, environment control, health care, military 
command control benefit greatly from this emerging technology. The Media has made 
important statements in favor of wireless sensor technology. In 2003, MIT’s 
Technology Review magazine described sensor networks as “one of the ten 
technologies that will change the world.” Moreover, ON World, a wireless research 
firm [1], stated in a report that more than half a billion nodes will be available for 
wireless sensor applications by 2010 for an end-user market worth at least $7 billion.  
In many sensor network applications, such as military applications, data 
integrity, and quite often confidentiality, are high priorities, leading to the question of 
to what degree the network is secure? So far, most of the research has focused on 
making sensor networks a reality. Security, relatively speaking, has not received as 
much concern primarily because of the difficulty of dealing with such devices under 
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stringent specifications (e.g., cost, computation power, memory space, energy) 
Applying conventional security techniques (cryptography) in such networks is 
impractical since these techniques require high processing capability. Traditionally, 
security relies heavily on cryptographic methods; nevertheless, a significant number 
of  problems require security specification that are beyond the scope and ability of all 
known cryptographic techniques; for example, cryptographic methods are blind to the 
quality of sensory data and it is quite possible that the security cryptic data is already 
compromised. 
Recalling our experience with the Internet and cellular networks, one can say 
that if the security of a given network architecture is not properly addressed  from the 
very beginning, its security can easily be breached  by malicious attacks. For instance, 
most of the existing routing protocols have been designed without security as a goal. 
Consequently, all of them are highly susceptible to all sorts of attacks. An attacker can 
divert some traffic, increase latency, or even bring the entire network down 
sometimes with as little effort as sending a single packet.   
However, introducing or reinforcing security mechanisms posteriori can be an 
expensive process and often can be ineffective. This principle equally applies to 
sensor networks. 
Wagner et. al., in [2], show a number of examples in which simple attacks 
were able to bring down a network running some known routing protocols, for 
example, TinyOS beaconing protocol. This protocol constructs a breadth first 
spanning tree rooted at a base station. A route update is initiated at the root and 
broadcast to the neighboring nodes, which, in turn, propagate the same update to the 
other nodes. Each node marks the sender as a parent node (Figure  1-1). 
 
 
Figure  1-1 A WSN Constructed Using TinyOS 
 
They have discussed a number of attacks, which are highlighted below.  
1. Spoofing Routing Information: Since routing updates are not authenticated, 
any node can claim to be a base station and, as a result, attract all the traffic 










Figure  1-2 An Adversary Spoofing a Routing Update from a Base Station 
 
2. Wormhole Attack: Implementing an authentication mechanism does not 
completely secure the protocol. An adversary who is interested in eavesdropping 
on, selectively modifying, or dropping off packets can still do so by mounting two 
colluding laptop-class nodes, one near the base station and one near the targeted 
area. The first node forwards authenticated routing updates to the second node 
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through an out-of-band communication channel in just a single hop, which makes 
it faster that it would be normally through multi-hop routing. They will create two 
isolated subtrees, with the second in the targeted area. Because the far subtree 
receives the routing update through the second adversary node, all the nodes will 
mark it as the parent node, resulting in all the traffic being tunnelled through it 




Figure  1-3 Canalizing All Traffic through Two Colluding Nodes 
 
 
3. Hello Flood Attack: Another simple attack, but an effective one, that can cripple 
the network is where a powerful adversary node can broadcast a HELLO packet 
to the entire network. All the nodes that receive the packet will mark the 
adversary as their parent even if their transmission range does not allow them to 





Figure  1-4 HELLO Flood Attack 
 
4. Loops: Routing loops can easily be created. An adversary can learn about a node’s 
neighbours and forge routing information propagated in the network. For example, 
it can let two nodes mark each other as parents by spoofing source addresses, 
causing all the traffic between the two nodes to bounce back and forth whenever 
messages are sent to either one of them.  
  
Security may become more demanding in certain applications than in others, 
e.g., military related services; yet it cannot be eliminated from any applications. Let 
us see a regulating application in which, for instance, a sensor network is installed in a 
large building to measure temperature. Measurements are sent to a control station in 
which the temperature average is calculated and, accordingly, a decision is made. If 
the average temperature exceeds a certain threshold, then the air conditioner is turned 
on. However, if there is not enough security in place, then the system will be prone to 
failure. If somebody knows where the sensors are, then he/she can simply overheat a 
single sensor and shift the average temperature, which may cause the air conditioner 
to turn on when it should not.  
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The previous examples stress the vitality of embedding security in routing 
protocols for the acceptance and use of sensor networks in many applications. Many 
of the existing routing protocols have the same deficiency. Wagner et al. provide a 
good analysis of some of the existing routing protocols and show their respective 
vulnerabilities. For example, Directed Diffusion, Geographic Routing, Minimum Cost 
Forwarding, LEACH, and Rumor Routing are considered highly susceptible to similar 
failures. 
Although sensor networks can be seen as a special type of ad hoc network, the 
existing network protocols that are designed for ad hoc networks, including the 
security protocols, cannot be implemented on sensor networks due to the following 
reasons are related: 
• Sensor nodes tend to be small, inexpensive, and very limited in hardware 
resources (processing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy), 
•  Sensor nodes are very prone to failure, 
• Sensor nodes lack physical security, and 
• Sensor nodes are deployed densely in a large number because of their short 
range communication ability. 
Newly designed protocols, therefore, are required to suit the special needs of 
the sensor networks. For example, in-network processing, such as data aggregation, is 
indubitably required to cut down the amount of data transmission.  Summarizing data, 
which is usually correlated, while travelling in the network towards the final 
collection point, helps improve the utilization of resources such as bandwidth and 
battery power. The fact that approximately 70% of the total energy is consumed on 
communication leads to the conclusion that data aggregation has the potential to 
tremendously enhance the network lifetime. Figure  1-5 depicts the difference between 
a network without data aggregation and another with data aggregation. 
  
       
(a) Without Data Aggregation  (b) With Data Aggregation 
 
Figure  1-5 Forwarding Packets With and Without Data Aggregation 
 
Data Aggregation and Security Challenges 
 
With the importance of in-network processing, however, enforcing security 
becomes a more challenging task. As a matter of fact, data aggregation techniques and 
security protocols face conflicts in their implementation.  On one side, to eliminate 
redundancy of data and thereby reduce the number of packets transmitted in the 
network, the data aggregation protocols require sensor data to be processed by the 
intermediate nodes as much as possible. Therefore, data should be available in the 
clear text at every intermediate node to perform the aggregation process.  On the other 
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side, security protocols commonly require that sensor nodes encrypt any data prior to 
transmission so that information confidentiality is achieved. Moreover, it is desired 
that data be encrypted at the source node, the sensing sensor, and stay encrypted all 
the way until it reaches the final destination, the home server, so that end-to-end 
security is realized. Handling data this way prevents information from leaking to a 
third party even if some of the intermediate nodes are malicious. The conflict occurs 
if the security protocol prevents decryption of data at the intermediate nodes; data 
aggregation then cannot be applied. Nevertheless, if intermediate nodes are given the 
ability to decrypt received sensor data, a compromised node can simply lie about the 
aggregation results, rendering the network useless. As a result, security protocols must 
handle this conflict by allowing data aggregation to take place while data integrity is 
maintained.  
The question that arises is how to meet those demands, especially with the 
existence of such new attacks as the node compromise attacks? In this newly 
emerging type of attack, the enemy gains full control over sensor nodes and aims at 
injecting false data into the network. Injecting false data can happen either through 
compromised or malfunctioning nodes. Consequences include violated data integrity 
requirement, false alarms, depleted battery power, and weakened computational and 
communication resources. In fact, the compromised nodes are able to defeat security 
cryptographic systems because they already possess the secret keys and, therefore, 
can successfully authenticate the false data to a neighboring node. Nonetheless, data 
aggregation cannot be sacrificed. Its high importance in reducing redundancy, 
expanding network lifetime, and enhancing data accuracy necessitates its 
implementation.  However, both data aggregation and false data infection cause 
sensor data modification, and so legitimate data and false data can be confused. For 
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those reasons, false data detection, compromised node elimination, and data 
aggregation protocols should be designed together so that the sensor network can 
survive and work successfully. 
This thesis addresses the problem of Byzantine faults, i.e., malicious nodes as 
well as malfunctioning ones. Those kinds of nodes, by definition, may report bad 
measurements deliberately, as in the case of malicious behaviour, or not deliberately, 
as in the case of malfunction. Our objective is to secure wireless sensor networks that 
are based on collecting data from a group of sensors and aggregating the fused data at 
special nodes, called aggregators, which, in turn, deliver the results to a central 
station. Our scheme ensures the validity of data and evaluates the honesty of sensor 
nodes.  
Presumably, cryptography promises a high level of security. This is quite true. 
Nevertheless, due to the poor HW capabilities of sensors, applying cryptographic 
tools would be very costly. Thus, cryptography tools are used only when needed; 
otherwise, communication between nodes continues without such tools. In other 
words, if a node is suspected to be behaving maliciously (lying about its 
measurement), that node is forced to use its stored keys for future communication, 
which eliminates possible outside attacks. If the misbehaviour continues, then the 
node is filtered out of the system, a possible inside attack being assumed. We use 
Generalized Extreme Studentized Algorithm (GESD) to detect Byzantine sensors, 
combined with an information theoretic measure to qualify trustworthiness of each 
sensor and to decide when a sensor is to be considered Byzantine. With this scheme, 
the network becomes intelligent, and energy is preserved; thus, its lifetime is 
increased. 
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The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background 
information on wireless sensor networks, their nature, applications, and typical 
paradigms. Their vulnerabilities and the challenges they face for employing security 
are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 3 documents the two main concepts, 
security in sensor networks, and data aggregation techniques in sensor networks, with 
an extensive list of the work done in these two directions. Moreover, the concept of 
Byzantine behaviour is introduced here to clarify the Byzantine type of threat to 
sensor networks. Next, Chapter 4 provides the details of the proposed approach to 
achieving secure data aggregation with the existence of Byzantine nodes. Simulation 
results are presented in this chapter.  Finally, concluding remarks and future research 











As defined earlier, wireless sensor networks are wireless networks that consist 
of individual nodes that are able to measure and communicate certain environmental 
phenomena using sensors; the nodes of a sensor network collaborate among one 
another to deliver measurements in the form of messages over wireless 
communication channels to a central station; without collaboration, a single node 
cannot fulfil the desired goal [3]. 
This chapter investigates typical software and hardware specifications of such 
networks and discusses their protocol stacks, applications, deployment paradigms. 


















2.1 Sensor Networks 
 
Sensor networks rely on sensing, processing and wireless communication 
abilities. Thanks to recent enhancements and developments in electronics, sensor 
networks have greater flexibility in terms of the solutions they can offer in a wide 
range of applications. It is now possible to implement more effective ways to trace or 
learn about certain physical phenomena in different environments, friendly or hostile. 
Nevertheless, sensor networks face some challenges that constrain or make difficult 
their implementation in certain areas. Those challenges are addressed in this chapter. 
It is envisioned that sensor networks will eventually cover and instrument the 
entire planet. They will continuously monitor and gather information on diverse 
phenomena, including endangered species, soil and air contaminants, patients, and 
industrial environments. However, their extent application is only limited by the 
availability of the sensing elements that can be employed. Some of the sensors used 
today include those that measure temperature, pressure, humidity, flow, vibration, 
brightness, mechanical stress, and proximity. Thus, sensor networks are well suited to 
a variety of monitoring and surveillance applications [4], including (Figure  2-2): 
• Wildlife monitoring. 
• Bushfire response. 
• Military command. 
• Distributed robotics. 
• Industrial quality control. 
• Observation of critical infrastructure. 
• Smart buildings. 
• Traffic monitoring. 
• Examining human heart. 















  (a) Environmental Monitoring      (b) Battle Field 
Figure  2-2 Examples of Sensor Network Applications 
 
2.2 Sensor Hardware Considerations 
 
The development of sensor nodes (hardware and software) has been greatly 
influenced by the type of application they serve. Generally, sensor nodes must be 
small, economical, energy efficient, equipped with sensing elements, good at 
computation performance, and have suitable wireless communication facilities. Figure 
 2-3 shows the main hardware components that build a typical sensor node: processor, 
memory, sensors, communication elements, and power supply [5,6,7]. However, it is 
important to note that some applications may require extra hardware components, for 
example, a GPS to locate a node, or UAVs to move a node, or a power generator. 
There follows an explanation of each of the four main components mentioned above: 
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1. Processor: consists of a processing unit, memory, and peripheral modules such 
as ADC, UART, timers, and interfaces connected through buses. The 
processor takes on the role of executing the code, such as the operating system 
and the application software, and also deals with data (acquisition, 
preprocessing and processing of incoming and outgoing information). 
2. Memory: similar to any computerized system, RAM and EPROM are used. 
The former is used for storing data samples under processing or messages 
either received or being sent. The latter (EEPROMs or flash EPROMs) are 
used to store the program code.  
3. Sensing Unit: consists of a sensor and ADC. It facilitates the interface unit to 
the environment. A variety of sensors are available today for sensing different 
physical phenomena. In terms of operation mechanism, sensors can be 
classified in three categories: 
• Passive omni-directional: sensors of this type of sensors measure a 
physical quantity without having to interfere with the environment, as, 
for instance, those that measure temperature, light, humidity and 
pressure. 
• Passive, narrow-beam: sensors of this type have to take a certain 
direction. Examples include ultrasonic sensors and cameras. 
• Active: such sensors provide measurements for samples collected from 
the environment. Radars and seismic sensors are of this type. 
 
4. Communication Elements: called transceivers; have the capability of 
transmission and reception at the same time. Their fundamental task is to 
convert bit streams coming internally from the controller into waves and vice 
versa. It is this unit that maintains the connection among nodes and forms the 
network. Radio frequency (RF) is commonly used because it offers a long 
range of communication at high rates and has a fairly small error rate. Besides, 
it does not require direct sight between transmitter and receiver. Other wireless 
communication options, such as optical, ultrasound, and electromagnetic, are 
also utilized in certain applications. 
5. Power Unit: an important component because it determines the lifetime of a 
node, hence the entire network. Usually a node feeds on a temporary source of 
power such as batteries. Other options include scavenging energy from the 











s e n so rs C P U ra d io
b a tte ry
A co u s t ic ,  s e ism ic , m a g n e t ic , 
e tc . in te r fa c e  
E le c t ro -m a g n e t ic  in te r fa c e
E v e n t  
d e te c t io n  
W ire le s s  c o m m u n ica t io n  w ith  
n e ig h b o r in g  n o d e s  
L im ite d  b a tte r y  s u p p ly
Figure  2-3: Sensor Node Hardware Components 
 
 
Today, Companies such as Crossbow [www.xbow.com], Intel 
[www.intel.com], and Ambient Systems [www.ambientsystems.com], develop, 
manufacture, and sell sensor nodes. Table 1 lists hardware specifications for three 
commonly used sensor nodes in research and commerce. 
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Table 1: Sensor HW Specifications 
 MICAZ µNODE Intel mote 
CPU 4MHz, 8-bit Atmel 16MHz, 16bit 16-bit, 12 MHz 
Flash memory 512KB 48KB 512 KB 
RAM 4KB 10KB 64 KB 
Radio frequency 916MHz, 30m range 868/917MHz, 50m 900 MHz 
Bandwidth 40Kbps 50kbps 100 Kbps 
 
Improvement in the hardware specifications is on going. MICA2, the next 
generation of motes by Crossbow, for example, is designed with a 32 bit processor, 
32MB RAM, and 32MB Flash memory, but this mote is still very expensive.   
 
2.3 Sensor Node Communication Architecture (Protocol 
Stack) 
 
Similar to all other communication devices, sensor network design complies 
with the layer design approach, in which every layer has to provide well-defined 
functionalities. According to [8], the protocol stack consists of the physical layer, data 
link layer, network layer, transport layer, and application layer (Figure  2-4), which 
are discussed below: 
• The Physical Layer: handles transmission, modulation, and receiving bit 
streams between two nodes. Frequency selection, carrier frequency 
generation, signal detection, modulation, and data encryption take place at 
this layer. In the design of the physical layer, energy becomes the most 
important aspect among many other issues, such as signal decay, 
scattering, shadowing, reflection, diffraction, multi-path, and fading. 
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Techniques such as ultrawideband (UWB) and impulse radio (IR) have 
been used to conserve energy.  
• The Data Link Layer: handles medium access, error control, multiplexing 
of data streams, and data frame detection. It ensures reliable point-to-point 
and broadcast connections. MAC protocol, as part of the data link layer, 
has to be energy aware and has to minimize collisions. Some examples of 
MAC protocols that are tailored specifically for sensor networks are Self-
organized Medium Access Control (SMAC) [9], Eavesdrop and Register 
(EARS) [9], and Hybrid TDMA/FDMA-based protocols [10]. 
• The Network Layer: deals specifically with packet routing, i.e., finding the 
most efficient path for a packet to go from a node to a given destination. 
Sensors form different paradigms for different applications and network 
differently from all other types of networks; hence, routing protocols have 
to be designed specifically for the sensor network. Relatively, the network 
layer has received the most attention, resulting in a variety of routing 
protocols, which can be categorized in the following techniques: flooding, 
gossiping, Sensor Protocols for Information via Negotiation (SPIN) [11], 
SAR (Sequential Assignment Routing) [9], Directed Diffusion [12], and 
many other routing techniques. 
• The Transport Layer: handles the flow of packets between two multi-hop-
away nodes. Nevertheless, the transport layer is not required in most 
sensor network applications. So far, research has not gone so deep in 
developing this layer as to match the specific requirements of sensor 
networks. One anticipated need is when connection to the Internet is 
required.  
• The Application Layer: represents the application software that handles 
certain tasks directly, which can be different from one application to 
another. With such a variety of application areas in sensor networks, 
protocols at this layer have to be flexible in order to provide transparent 
access to lower hardware and software layers. Research has yet to be 
conducted to develop new protocols and to enhance the current protocols, 
such as Sensor Management Protocol (SMP), Task Assignment and Data 
Advertisement Protocol (TADAP), and Sensor Query and Data 
Dissemination Protocol (SQDDP) (the three protocols are discussed in 














    (a) Protocol Stack    (b) Cross-layer information exchange  
 
Figure  2-4: Sensor Network Communication Architecture 
 
As Figure  2-4(a) shows, there are three additional layers in another dimension: 
power management plane, mobility management plane, and task management plane. 
The first one manages how a sensor consumes its power economically, for example, 
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turn off the sensor when it is idle. The second plane handles the movement of a sensor 
node, i.e., detects and registers the location every time the sensor moves so that 
routing is always maintained. The third plane deals with scheduling tasks among 
sensor nodes in a given area of interest, i.e., sensors perform the sensing task at 
different times according to the task management unit. As a result, the three 
management planes allow sensors to collaborate in a power efficient way, maintain 
routing in a mobile network, and allow sharing resources among sensor nodes. 
A Cross-layer approach is adopted in designing sensor network 
communication architecture, attempting to resolve the limitations in the layered 
approach discussed above. The new design proposes to have modules that involve, as 
part of their functionalities, communication interfaces to other modules in other 
layers, including non-adjacent ones Figure  2-4(b). For example, information available 
at the physical layer, such as signal strength of a neighboring node, can be of help to 
the routing protocol at the network layer in such a way to make different forwarding 
decisions accordingly. cross-layer design is anticipated to offer more flexibility and 
lead to optimization. Nonetheless, careful design is required; otherwise, it would 
degrade the system performance.  
 
2.4 Challenges: Sensor Capability and Security 
 
Different from ordinary computer networks, applying security in the field of 
wireless sensor networks faces special challenges or difficulties due to certain 
constraints.  
This section summarizes sensor capabilities in terms of resources, 
communication facility, and nature of operation. 
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• Poor Resources (memory, processor, and power): as can be inferred from Table 1 
above, sensors are deprived of the luxury of having strong resources, similar to all 
other networks, to run security algorithms, which demand a certain amount of 
resources - memory space for the code and data, processing power, and energy. 
Therefore, security algorithms code has to be kept small, which may involve 
modification and optimization to traditional security functions. For example, a 
sensor with 8 bit, 4MHz processor and 8KB memory, such as the Smart Dust, has 
the challenge of compiling together the operating system (TinyOS, 4KB), the core 
scheduler (178Bytes), and the application code. Therefore, adding on top of those 
components security algorithms can be challenging.  
Energy also restricts the freedom of implementing a large code or exchange 
long packets. Sensors feed on temporary power sources (i.e., battery), which 
cannot be replaced or recharged once deployed in a sensor network. Therefore, 
when adding a cryptographic function or protocol, the energy impact of the added 
code must be considered as to how that would affect the lifetime of a node. 
Consumption of extra Jules is directly related to the extra processing required to 
run the cryptographic function (e.g., encryption, decryption, signing data, and 
verifying signatures), to the transmission of overhead bits and data related to the 
security function, and to the energy required for storing security parameters (e.g., 
cryptographic keys). 
 
• Unreliable Communication: communication between sensors is not reliable, 
mainly suffering from collisions, latency, and the connectionless nature of packets 
routing, which degrades heavily sensors security because the security of a network 
relies directly on a defined protocol, which, in turn, relies on communication.  
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Due to the broadcast nature of sensor networks, the chance of collision to 
occur is high. Increased collision result in an unreliable communication and hence 
a given security protocol may fail to run properly. The denser the network is, the 
more collisions are to be expected.  
As the number of nodes increases, congestion becomes worse, routing paths 
become longer, and nodes will have to process more data. Those three factors 
incur more delay in the network. Consequently, synchronization among sensor 
nodes can heavily be achieved. Security mechanisms require exchange of 
information in a timely fashion strictly, e.g., distribution of cryptographic keys or 
prevention of reply attacks.  
Error rate in wireless sensor networks by default is high, leading to packet loss 
and damage. Software developers are required to handle errors by incorporating 
the mechanism for that, such as error detection and correction. However, on one 
hand, such mechanisms entail more resources and incur overhead. On the other 
hand, lack of an error handling mechanism may result in losing critical security 
packets, e.g., cryptographic keys. 
 
• Unattended Operation: in most cases, once sensors are deployed, they are left 
unattended, behind enemy lines in some cases. Management, for example, may 
take place remotely. As a result, physically tampering with sensors is very likely 
to happen and detection is extremely difficult. It can be assumed that for a sensor 
being unattended for a long time, compromise is likely to have happened and 
security mechanisms have to take this into account. 
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2.5 Threats to a WSN 
 
After deployment, a sensor network encounters many vulnerabilities and 
threats, to which employed protocols must be alert in order to mitigate those 
challenges. Threats extend from non-deliberate node breakdown, such as power 
failure or hardware or software crash, or adversarial attack, such as physical 
tempering or eavesdropping. The following list identifies those threats. 
Passive Information Gathering: an intruder can place a device with a powerful 
receiver inside the network between nodes to eavesdrop on the ongoing traffic without 
interleaving. 
Subversion of a node: that sensors are deployed in remote locations and are 
left unattended, node compromise is to be expected. An attacker is interested in 
uncovering the information stored in a sensor node, such as cryptographic keys, and 
possibly be able to inject false messages through this node, thereby becoming an 
insider attacker. For those reasons, nodes must be designed to be tamper resistant and 
react to any compromise attempts. For example, a node should delete its program 
memory content and its secret keys once node capture occurs. 
False Node: in absence of security mechanisms, an intruder can add a false 
node to a sensor network. The intruder’s node is usually powerful and has the 
capability of impersonating a legitimate node. Being part of the network, the added 
node can disrupt the network operation by, for example, dropping packets, injecting 




Node Malfunction: A node may become defective for ordinary reasons and, 
therefore, outputs wrong data. It is worse if a node that serves as an aggregation point 
or a cluster head becomes faulty. Sensor networks should involve the mechanism by 
which they can detect and eliminate damaged nodes. 
Node outage: in addition to malfunctioning, a sensor may stop responding 
completely. If such a node serves as an aggregator, or cluster head, or simply as an 
intermediate node through which traffic is routed, then a sensor network should have 
the enough mechanism to detect such outage and, accordingly, provide an alternative 
node immediately.  
 
2.6 Security Requirements 
 
Sensor networks pose special security requirements due to the constraints 
discussed above (section 4). The choice of which security services to implement on a 
given sensor mainly depends on the type of application and its security requirements – 
availability, data confidentiality, data integrity, data freshness, and self-organization. 
Below is a discussion of each of them: 
 
Availability: 
Generally, availability can be defined as the survivability of a network. A 
network should consistently and continually provide the service that it promises 
despite the existence of any attacks. The reason of adding cryptographic functions is 
to protect the sensor network from attackers whose goal is to bring down the network 
or at least decrease its lifetime. However, involving cryptography is not free. In fact, 
modifying cryptographic tools to fit sensor networks and achieve the same level of 
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security as in other networks unfortunately adds to the cost. For example, some of the 
techniques propose for modification additional communication, reuse and adjustment 
to the current security functions code, and/or centralized schemes instead. Such 
techniques impact the availability of sensors and sensor networks because additional 
computations and communication consume additional energy, thus decreasing sensor 
lifetime. Centralized schemes are also a great threat to the availability as they 
introduce a single point of failure. 
 
Data Confidentiality (Privacy): 
Confidentiality means restricting access to information to only those 
authorized to have access. In certain sensor network applications, confidentiality 
becomes big concern. For example, it could be of high importance (e.g., in military 
applications) to secure sensor readings from leaking to other neighboring networks 
(e.g., adversary’s network). In another example, nodes may have to exchange 
sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, for which secure channels are required. 
Furthermore, to prevent traffic analysis attacks, information such sensors identities 
and public keys have to be encrypted. 
The standard technique for achieving confidentiality is through encryption/ 
decryption mechanism using secret keys that only legitimate parties posses. 
 
Data Integrity  
The term data integrity refers to the mechanism that guarantees that data has 
not been altered in transit. Without this security requirement, data is not safe as any 
adversary can change the data or fake some messages. In certain applications, 
 25
confidentiality is not as important as data integrity, allowing an adversary to 
eavesdrop and learn about the real data but not to change it. 
 The standard method for achieving data integrity is using a hash function, 
which produces a digest value that uniquely represents a packet. A change in even a 
single bit would indicate data forgery.  
 
Source Authentication (Data Authentication) 
By definition, data authentication allows a receiver to verify that the data is 
truly sent by the claimed sender. Obviously, an adversary can replace the whole 
packet stream by injecting additional packets with rehashed digests. In many 
communication sessions, such as administrative tasks (e.g., control commands), the 
receiver needs to confirm the data origin before applying received information in any 
decision-making process.   
Data authentication is achieved by using keyed hash functions, also called 
Message Authentication Code (MAC). Two nodes possessing a shared symmetric key 
can achieve data authentication easily by computing (at the sender side) and verifying 
(at the receiver side) MAC values for all communicated data. In the case that 
authenticating a broadcast message is required, a different mechanism for example, 
asymmetric cryptosystem or µTESLA protocol [14], must be applied. 
 
Data Freshness 
Data freshness brings up the issue of how recent the data is. Assuming data 
confidentiality and integrity are achieved, Networks cannot afford not ensuring 
freshness of each message so that old messages are not replayed. This requirement is 
especially important when there are shared-key strategies employed in the design. 
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Different packets are typically processed with different keys, but distributing new 
keys every time is hard to realize. For this reason, launching replay attacks seems to 
be appealing to attackers and can cause confusion in the network especially if a node 
is unaware of key change.     
Typically, to achieve data freshness and prevent replay attack a new nonce (a 
randomly generated number), or another time-related counter, is attached to the 
message.  
 
2.7 Operational Paradigms and Corresponding 
vulnerabilities 
 
It is important at first to make a distinction between sensor networks and their 
ancestors, ad hoc networks. The two are usually confused for the similarities they 
share. Both, for example, take advantage of multi-hop networking for communication 
among nodes lying outside one another’s communication range. However, a number 
of dissimilarities can be observed between the two. Sensors are more resource limited, 
are usually deployed densely, are more prone to failures, and are several orders higher 
in number. Furthermore, sensor nodes often observe the same or correlated 
environmental events, which necessitate in-network processing to eliminate 
duplication. In terms of routing, in ad-hoc networks, communication can take place 
between any pair of nodes; whereas sensor networks support only certain 
communication patterns, such as the following: 
1. Many-to-one: clustered sensors send their readings to an aggregation node or 
to a base station. 
2. One-to-many: usually this takes place in the form of broadcasting a query, 
submitted by a base station for example. 
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3. Local communication: nodes within the same radio range may exchange local 
information, for example, in the process of forming clusters. 
 
Sensor networks vary in their architecture depending on the application needs, 
i.e., certain components may be installed in different ways. However, typically, a 
sensor network, similar to the one shown in Figure  2-5, consists of certain 
components, namely, sensor nodes, a sensor field, a sink, and a task manager, all 
defined below: 
 
• Sensors or motes compose the heart of the network. They function as sensing 
elements to read environmental data and as routers to deliver information to 
the sink node. The number and density of sensors deployed in a location are 
determined by the application in question. A few sensors, or sometimes 
hundreds to several thousands of sensors, are required. 
• Sensor field defines the area of interest, i.e., the area in which a physical 
phenomenon is to be monitored. Sensors are deployed in such a way to cover 
that area.  
• A sink, called an aggregator sometimes, is a special sensor usually with 
enhanced capabilities and with a specific task. There can be multiple sinks in a 
sensor network. They receive messages from multiple sensors, process this 
received information, and combine messages in order to reduce the total 
number of messages in the network, hence optimizing the network overall 
energy consumption.  
• Task manager, also called base station and home server, is a centralized 
control station from which queries are initiated. Usually it is remote from the 
area monitored. Upon a query sent from the task manager and broadcast to 
sensors in a certain area, the sensing process takes place and results are 
streamed back through sensors and sinks to reach the task manager. Some sort 





Figure  2-5: Typical Sensor Network Structure 
 
 
The discussion above suggest that sensor networks follow different models of 
operation (or paradigms) and that security requirements differ according to the type of 
network. Some operational paradigms can be as simple as sensors performing 
measurements and pass them directly to a central station. Others involve complex 
mechanisms, such as routing and/or aggregation. Because of the variety of operation 
paradigms, designing a unified security model is not feasible. Security goals will 
depend on the type of network, security requirements, and the assumptions about the 
adversary’s target and capabilities. For example, is the network an aggregation one? 
Should the messages contents be encrypted or is messages integrity enough? What is 
the required level of robustness? How powerful is the adversary in capturing and 
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compromising nodes? Many more questions can be asked to help in maintaining 
proper security measures.  
The following is a categorization and a brief discussion of the operational 
paradigms and their corresponding vulnerabilities [15]. 
 
Collect and Transmit: this paradigm represents the simplest sensor network model, in 
which sensors are only concerned with their transmittal to a within-range base station. 
Thus, multi-hop routing or co-operation among nodes is not to be concerned about. 
Sensors can perform their tasks either in a periodic manner or event driven.  
This paradigm is vulnerable to a number of attacks. In denial-of-service, for 
example, an attacker tries to jam the radio signal and cause collision. Eavesdropping 
on traffic and  spoofing packets are also possible. Additionally, similar to all other 
paradigms, physical attacks, meaning capturing and compromising nodes, are very 
possible.  
 
Forward: different from the previous paradigm, nodes co-operate among one another 
as every sensor transmits its measurement to one or more neighboring sensors, which, 
in turn, propagate the same data to additional sensors. Retransmission continues at 
every node until the data is received at the central station eventually.  
All the vulnerabilities mentioned in the Simple Collection and Transmittal 
paradigm and others apply to the Forward paradigm. Because this paradigm is more 
sophisticated with the new functionalities, such as routing, vulnerabilities are more. 
For example, nodes on the way of traffic may corrupt data and lie about 
measurements. Moreover, malicious nodes may flood the network intensively with 
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messages, consequently causing sensors to exhaust their resources (e.g., energy) in 
trying to forward all received data. 
 
Receive and Process Command: in this paradigm, forwarding of packets also takes 
place towards the base station (many-to-one communication). Additionally, 
propagation of a special type of messages, called commands, move in the opposite 
direction, from a controller or base station to the network nodes, either in a broadcast 
form to multiple nodes (or probably the entire network) or unicast form to a specific 
node (one-to-many communication). Those commands are required to configure or 
reconfigure the network and hence control the amount of data in the network, e.g., 
specify or modify the periodicity of performing a certain measurement.    
One vulnerability to mention on top of all the discussed vulnerabilities in the 
previous paradigms is the threat of impersonating the controller and thereby 
disseminating misleading commands. 
 
Self-Organization: because of the scalability to hundreds or thousands of nodes 
requirement, sensors need to self-organize themselves as to determine the topology 
every time it changes, adding or removing nodes. Clustering is one technique to 
achieve self-organization, in which certain nodes that are believed to be more 
powerful according to some criteria are elected as cluster heads. The elected nodes 
will function as routers as they receive packets from the same cluster sensors (intra-
cluster communication) and pass those packets to other cluster heads (inter-cluster 
communication) with the intention that the packets will arrive at the base station.  
The paradigm here depends heavily on the ability to route traffic along the 
routing nodes. As such, on top of all the vulnerabilities mentioned so far, attacking the 
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routing protocol can harm the network greatly; for example, create routing loops, 
leaving the network stranded.   
 
Data Aggregation: The large number of nodes may lead to enormous amount of data 
in the network, causing the network to degrade performance and shorten its lifetime. 
For those reasons, there exists nodes whose responsibility, besides sensing, is to 
aggregate or combine messages coming from different nodes, resulting in much less 
traffic.  
In addition to the common vulnerabilities (impersonation, lying about data, 
dropping packets deliberately), authentication specifically is more difficult to achieve 
in this paradigm because it is the aggregator now, not the base station, who must 
ensure senders authenticity before processing the received data. In Chapter 3, data 
aggregation and corresponding security protocols are presented and explained in 
detail. 
  
Flexibility and Adaptation: this paradigm adds to the intelligence of a sensor network 
as sensors decide on their own what to do next based on their measurements. For 
example, a node may decide not to do inter-cluster communication if its power 
becomes less. Similar to the aggregation paradigm, that nodes make decisions and 
manipulate data require trusting nodes and authenticating them, which is very difficult 
in reality.   
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3CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW  




This chapter addresses two important issues in sensor networks: security and data 
aggregation. A review of literature of research work conducted to address these two 
issues is reported.  In summary, this chapter discusses the following topics: 
1. Introduction to the Byzantine behaviour problem as originally introduced by 
Lamport et al [16]. Introduction to cryptographic systems, symmetric and 
asymmetric, their relevance to SN; a discussion on their incurred energy cost 
implication is also provided. 
2. Introduction to wireless sensor networks vulnerabilities and attacks, and a 
summary of various existing secure protocols. 
3. Overview of the concept of information aggregation and the different 
techniques that are used to aggregate data in SN. 
 
3.1 Byzantine Behaviour 
 
Definition: in networking [16,17,18], the term Byzantine refers to certain nodes 
in the network that exhibit abnormal behaviour. Specifically, it addresses two kinds of 
such behaviour: malfunctioning and malice. In the first type, nodes might operate 
incorrectly due to power outage or wrong configuration. In the second type, malicious 
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nodes might provide incorrect information, lie about routing information, discriminate 
between different kinds of traffic by forwarding some and dropping others. It is 
assumed that malicious nodes can disrupt the network in various ways while staying 
undetected.  
The concept of Byzantine behaviour was first introduced by Lamport et al. 
[16], and in which they called the “Byzantine Generals Problem.” Below is a 
summary of the problem, a description of the way it was originally addressed, and the 
follow up citations.  
Lamport et al. [16] pioneered the work to addressing the problem of consensus 
in distributed systems, presenting it in terms of a story known as the “Byzantine 
Generals Problem.” Briefly, in that problem, there are a number of processors, n, 
known as generals. They form a mesh network such that any pair of the generals can 
communicate privately through channels called “oral messages.” One of the generals 
is assumed to have a special role (commander), in that he sends a binary value 
(command) to the n-1 generals, called lieutenants. The binary value corresponds to 
“attack” or “retreat.”  
The idea is that some of the generals, including the commander, might be 
traitorous. A traitorous general may exhibit a devious manner, such as by failing to 
send messages, sending malformed messages, sending forged messages, or sending 
contradictory messages to different nodes. However, the desired behaviour is that the 
honest generals (non-faulty processors) are supposed to reach an agreement with the 
following three conditions: 
• Termination: Eventually each honest general sets its decision. 
• Agreement: the decision value is the same for all the honest generals. 
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• Integrity: if the commander is honest, then all honest generals decide on the 
value that the commander initiated. 
The concept was appreciated by the computer science community and inspired its 
members to generate hundreds of papers and theses. Some of the results are 
summarized here: 
• No solution can exist if less than or equal to 2/3 generals are honest. [19]. 
• If t faults are to be tolerated, at least t rounds are required for any deterministic 
algorithm [20]. 
• In an asynchronous system, the problem is unsolvable [21]. 
As a result of these findings, bringing the notion of consensus to networks seems 
more challenging because networks are not necessarily fully connected and 
communication in reality is asynchronous, not to mention that the information to be 
delivered is not as simple as just attack or retreat. However, cryptography is 
promising to make the problem appear tractable. The next sections show how such a 
network can be designed and implemented with the existence of Byzantine nodes. 
 
3.1.1 Byzantine Behaviour and Security 
 
Byzantine behaviour is usually used in the context of security. However, the 
distinction between the two should be made clear. Byzantine failure models were not 
originally meant to deal with malicious attacks. Assumptions such as n>3t, for 
example, are hard to justify when assuming malicious intent, as nodes in this case 
may collude, resulting in nondependent node failures. Byzantine behaviour does not 
address the issue of data secrecy either, i.e., data confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication. As a matter of fact, Byzantine algorithms require replication of 
 35
messages, which means that confidential data can at increased risk. The key and the 
only solution for data secrecy is to involve cryptographic models. 
Byzantine models and security models should be thought of as complementary 
components for a robust system, that is, one that ensures both network survivability 
and data secrecy. 
 
3.1.2 Levels of Robustness 
 
All networks are prone to failures as a result of corrupted nodes or 
disconnected communication links. With Byzantine nodes, failures happen because of 
abnormal functioning, whether deliberate or not. Algorithm robustness can be 
categorized in the following four levels: 
Simple Failures: Some networks ignore the possibility of node failure. As a result 
such networks continue to operate in the existence of malfunctioning nodes but 
incorrectly. This situation makes maintenance tasks complicated because manual 
intervention is required to bring the network up again. 
Self Stabilization: Algorithms under this category show a slight improvement over 
the previous category. They guarantee correctness as long as the network is free of 
malfunctioning nodes, which can be achieved only after such nodes are removed. 
Detection of Byzantine Behaviour: Algorithms designed with this property are not 
able to work properly with the existence of Byzantine nodes; however, they make 
identifying a corrupted node easy. Combining this property with self-stabilization 
enhances the robustness of such algorithms. 
 36
Byzantine Robustness This property demands the highest standard of network 
survivability: a network continues to work correctly even with the existence of faulty 
nodes. However, Byzantine detection is not necessarily achieved. 
Recently, a number of papers, such as [23,24,17,18], have shown the need for 
integrating an algorithm, such as routing, with Byzantine robustness to mitigate 
internal attacks and therefore ensure network operability at all times.  
Yu et al. in [23], secure their routing algorithm against external and internal 
(Byzantine) attacks. Specifically, asymmetric cryptographic functions are used to 
defend against external attacks. These functions assume that each node holds a 
private/public key pair. Nodes learn their neighbours through signed route discovery 
messages. Then each node creates a set of shared keys that it can use with different 
nodes at different levels of neighbourhood - 1-hop, 2-hop, or more. They defend 
against Byzantine attack by using message and route redundancy. After the route 
discovery phase, a route can be selected among disjointed routes. A compromised 
node, at worse, can drop packets, but because of the redundancy of the packets, the 
destination expects to receive the same message from different nodes. Not receiving it 
from certain nodes suggests Byzantine behaviour. A message is broadcast upstream 
and downstream to let both the source and destination learn about any malicious 
nodes. Each node builds a local trust repository for the nodes it knows, based on the 
observed behaviour. Accordingly, a path containing a node with a low trust value is 
excluded. 
Awerbuch et al., in [24], claim a Byzantine resilient routing protocol that 
consists of three phases. The first phase is route discovery with fault avoidance, which 
is achieved through flooding and using cryptographic primitives, finding thereby a 
number of paths with different weights between the source and destination. The 
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second phase is Byzantine fault detection, which is realized by probing the nodes 
composing a path. Nodes on the path, including the destination, return 
acknowledgement messages to the source. Failing to do so lets the source mark the 
path as faulty. Through the probing mechanism, the source can also detect the faulty 
nodes and is able, in phase three, to assign weights to the discovered links.  
This protocol, in fact, cannot scale to a large network or a hierarchal one. The 
number of acknowledgement packets to a single request is very high, even in the 
absence of an attacker. 
Perlman’s work objective in [17] is to secure the network layer, preventing 
malicious nodes from generating incorrect routing information. The security model 
used is centralized and based on public key cryptography, that is, by assuming that 
one node, T, is trustworthy. T holds all the public keys of the other nodes. If a node 
requires a key for communication with another node, it sends a request to T. 
Because of the high number of messages involved, asymmetric cryptography, 
and the need for a cache for every link, this protocol requires powerful machines for 
implementation.  
 




The severe resource constraints limit the freedom in applying cryptographic 
primitives in sensor networks.  For example, some researchers argue that asymmetric 
cryptography (or public key) is not feasible at all because of its high memory and 
power consumption requirements [14, 26]. A hardware solution, such as the one in 
[25], to public key cryptography in sensor networks seems to be costly and not 
practical in a large network. Symmetric cryptography is the alternative. As has been 
argued by Wagner et al, in [27], symmetric system tools provide an acceptable level 
of security, making them preferred over those for asymmetric systems. Below is a 




Symmetric cryptography is base on two communicating parties sharing the 
same secret key (Figure  3-1). The sender uses the secret key to encrypt a message (or 
any cryptographic function), and the receiver uses the same key to decrypt the 
message. Symmetric cryptography satisfies the sensor network resource constraints, 
and it is fast and does not consume much power. The problem with symmetric 
cryptography, however, is the difficulty of secret key distribution and management, 
for example, how to supply two sensors with the same key without revealing it to 

















Asymmetric cryptography was introduced initially to solve the key 
distribution problem. Asymmetric cryptography is different in that every 
communication party possesses a pair of keys; one is kept secret and called the private 
key and the other is distributed and called the public key (Figure  3-2). The sender 
uses the receiver’s public key to encrypt a message, and the receiver side uses its own 
private key to decrypt it. Authentication is also possible through this system. The 
sender can send a tag by hashing a message by its private key, and the receiver can 
verify the message using the sender’s public key. Unfortunately, asymmetric 
cryptography requires very high computational power because it is based on complex 















A good explanation of basic cryptographic primitives, based on symmetric and 
asymmetric systems, can be found in [28] by Menzes et al. Such primitives include 
Hash Function, Pseudo-Random Function (PRF), Message Authentication Code 
(MAC), encryption, decryption, and many other primitives. Implementing a 
cryptographic function, though, is not straightforward. Decisions of whether to use 
symmetric or asymmetric solutions and what specific cryptographic algorithm to use 
must be made first. Wei et al. [29] present a comparative analysis of various 
symmetric ciphers, such as RC5, RC6, Rijndael, MISTY1, KASUMI, and Camellia. 
Gura et al. [30] provide an experimental analysis of RSA and elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) on sensor networks. 
 
3.2.2 Energy Constraint 
 
Being a micro-electronic device, a sensor node can only be equipped with a 
limited energy source, e.g., less than 0.5Ah and about 1.2V battery. Energy, therefore, 
is the scarcest of all sensor resources. Each milliamp consumed brings the sensor one 
milliamp closer to death. Thus, to expand the lifetime, nearly every aspect of sensor 
networks must be designed with power in mind. For example, when working at full 
power, a typical sensor, such as MICA2, can operate only for two weeks or so before 
it dies. The goal is to elongate its lifetime to months or years.   
For the sake of analysis, power consumption is directly linked to the tasks a 
sensor node performs. It detects events, performs internal processing, and finally 
transmits data. Thus, power dissipation can be divided into three categories: sensing, 
data processing, and communication. Of the three categories, a sensor node expends 
maximum energy in data communication, transmission and reception. For example, 
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the transmission of each bit is equivalent in power consumption to executing 800 – 
1000 instructions. Consequently, as far as security is concerned, a system that uses 
cryptography incurs extra overhead in the length of messages transmitted and also 
extra use of the memory and processor. In sensor networks, as opposed to 
conventional networks, a packet is very small, typically 30 bytes. A cryptographic 
primitive that adds 8 bytes, for example, incurs an overhead of almost 25%.  
Several studies have been conducted addressing energy consumption problems 
and suggesting solutions for the use of security services in sensor networks. Perrig et 
al., in [322], develop µTESLA and SNEP security tools (discussed in section  3.2.4 ). 
In trying to keep the overhead small, they suggest the use of a stream cipher for 
encryption because that results in the same encrypted message size as that of the 
plaintext. However, MAC adds an overhead of around 8 bytes to a 30-byte message. 
As a result, for an encrypted and authenticated message, the cost reaches around 30% 
overhead. This overhead is mainly due to the transmission of extra data rather than 
computational cost, which is around 3% only.   
In [32], Wagner et al. also develop two security mechanisms, namely, 
TineSec-Auth (for authentication), and TinySec-AE (for authentication and 
encryption). For the encryption, they have chosen to use Skipjack, which is a block 
cipher but thought to be more secure than stream ciphers. For authentication, they 
employ CBC-MAC, whose code is partially used in skipjack. As far as energy is 
concerned, TinySec-AE includes 5 bytes of overhead, causing 13.6% of energy 
consumption increase. On the other hand, TinySec-Auth increases the packet length 
by 1 byte, leading to 2.6% of energy consumption overhead.  
More work is presented by Kelner et al. in [22], in which they study several 
security algorithms in terms of the energy consumption caused by radio, CPU, and 
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memory. They implement them on MICA2 sensors and provide actual energy 
consumption measurements according to the formula E=V×I× T (where E is energy 
in Joules, V is voltage in Volts, I is current in Amperes, and T is time duration in 
Seconds).  Their tests include SkipJack, RC5, RC6, TEA, and DES. They conclude 
that DES is unsuitable to sensor networks because of the high energy consumption 
consequence, while SkipJack, RC5, and TEA are possible candidates as far as energy 
is concerned. 
 
3.2.3 Types of Attacks 
 
Sensor networks are highly susceptible to a variety of attacks. In fact, many of 
the attacks that target wired networks and ad hoc networks are considered possible 
threats to sensor networks as well. Additionally, some of the attacks are specific to 
wireless sensor networks to disrupt, in particular, their functionalities, e.g., routing, 
time synchronization, sensing. Attacks can be classified based on the power of the 
attacker’s devices and on whether the attacker has gained access to the network [2]. In 
the first case, either mote-class or laptop-class equipment can be used. Mote-class 
attacks assume that the attacker uses malicious sensor nodes similar in their 
capabilities to the ones in the targeted network, causing harm to only a few nodes at 
worst, for example, by jamming the radio signal within the malicious node’s range. 
Laptop-class attacks, on the other hand, are more harmful, as they may disrupt the 
entire network using only one powerful machine, such as a laptop or an equivalent 
machine with a strong transmitter and sensitive antenna. Attackers can be seen also as 
outsiders or insiders. In the former, the attacker does not have access to the network. 
However, when this attacker manages to compromise a legitimate node or to steal the 
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security keying material, the attacker becomes an insider, leading to more dangerous 
attacks, especially when laptop-class devices are used.  
The following is a collection of well-defined threats drawn from different 
papers. 
 
Denial of Service (DoS): Many attacks can be described in terms of DoS. However, 
this term is usually linked with attacks that mainly waste resources or disrupt services 
with little effort by an attacker. The most common such attacks target in specific the 
physical layer and data link layer. At the physical layer, sensor networks may 
experience jamming [34], which can be launched simply by the transmission of radio 
signals that interfere with the sensor network frequencies. As a result, communication 
among nodes fails as long as the attack is maintained. Physically tampering with 
nodes is also a serious threat. For example, the attacker can damage the sensor node, 
replace code, or spoof the sensing element measurements to provide erroneous 
readings. At the data link layer, causing collisions is the main threat, and is described 
also as link layer jamming. An adversary tries to corrupt a transmitted data packet or 
acknowledgement packet by sending packets at the same time. Some data link 
protocols, consequently, require retransmission of failed data packets, leading to 
battery depletion. Corruption of ACK packets also lead to costly exponential back-off 
time in certain MAC protocols. 
As mentioned above, other attacks targeting network, transport, and 
application layers could be classified under DoS. Nevertheless, a list of different 
attacks is introduced separately below.  
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Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing Information: [2] In attacks of network 
layer, network operability can be disrupted very easily if the routing information 
exchanged between the nodes is targeted. For example, this attack can result in 
routing loops, rejecting or attracting traffic, partitioning the network, or increasing 
delay between source and destination. 
 
Hello Flood: [2] This attack targets certain routing protocols that rely on broadcasting 
HELLO packets to learn about the neighbouring nodes, e.g., TinyOS beaconing 
protocol, and clustering based protocols, such as LEACH. A malicious node with high 
transmission power can send, record, or replay HELLO messages to reach sensor 
nodes in the area. The goal is to create an illusion of being a neighbour to many nodes 
in the network. Consequently, the nodes mark the adversary as a neighbour even 
though they cannot communicate back to the adversary, which leaves those nodes 
stranded. Authentication does not solve the problem completely because the adversary 
may also replay legitimate packets. Rather, bidirectionality of the communication 
should be checked. 
 
Selective Forwarding/ Black Hole: [2] Routing algorithms often assume that nodes 
are trustworthy. A malicious node, for example, working as part of the network, can 
selectively drop certain types of traffic and forward others. Black Hole is the extreme 
case of selective forwarding, in which a malicious node blocks the traffic flow by 
dropping all the packets. However, routing techniques are usually able to discover 
traffic blockage in a given path and reroute packets accordingly. Some examples of 
the protocols affected by these attacks are directed diffusion, TinyOS beaconing, and 
geographic routing protocols, such as GPSR [35]. 
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Acknowledgement spoofing: [2] A smarter way of mounting Selective Forwarding 
or Black Hole attacks can be achieved through acknowledgement spoofing. In the 
routing protocols that choose the next hop based on reliability issues, the adversary 
can convince the sender that a weak or even a dead link is a strong one by faking link 
layer acknowledgment packets, which leads the sender to assume that the link can be 
trusted and used for future sessions even though the real data packets are actually lost.    
 
Wormhole: [36] This attack requires at least two colluding malicious nodes, one of 
which is located in the area of interest (usually close to the sink), tunnelling messages 
to the second one over a fast link. A Wormhole attack’s goal is to disrupt routing 
algorithms by convincing two multi-hop distant nodes that they are only one hop 
apart. Furthermore, it makes selective forwarding and eavesdropping more achievable 
because all traffic is attracted to pass through the malicious nodes. Rumor routing and 
minimum cost forwarding are some of the routing protocols that can be attacked this 
way. 
 
Sinkhole Attacks [2]: in this attack, the adversary mounts a device (usually a 
powerful one, such as a laptop) that appeals to the neighbouring nodes with respect to 
the routing algorithm so that all traffic is pulled towards the malicious device (as the 
attack name suggests). Since the traffic flows through the attacker’s node, tampering 
with packets becomes much easier, and various sorts of attacks become possible (e.g., 
black hole, selective forwarding, modifying data).   
A Sinkhole attack is particularly easy to create because of the routing nature in 
sensor networks whereby traffic from everywhere is directed to the same common 
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destination. Routing algorithms always look for the best path. The sinkhole node can 
simply claim to provide a single high quality route. 
 
The Sybil Attack [37]: To defeat the existence of Byzantine nodes, many routing 
algorithms maintain fault-tolerant schemes, such as finding multiple disjointed paths. 
The Sybil attack is known to defeat such mechanisms because in such an attack a 
single malicious node presents itself with multiple identities to other nodes in the 
network, leading to the illusion that multiple paths are present. 
Furthermore, geographic routing protocols are also susceptible to Sybil 
attacks. For example, location-aware routing algorithms require nodes to exchange 
information about one another’s position for use it in the packet’s address. Sybil 
attacks can simply announce multiple locations simultaneously, causing the routing 
algorithm to fail. 
 
Time Synchronization Attacks: Song et al., in [58], present delay attack, which aims 
at corrupting time synchronization protocols in the transport layer so as to create a gap 
with respect to time between nodes. In many sensor network applications, such as 
object tracking, message ordering, data aggregation, time synchronization is an 
essential part of the application success. For example, in object tracking, unless 
sensing nodes are able to record the time and location of a moving object precisely, 
there will be no accurate information. Therefore, attacking the time synchronization 
scheme appeals to an adversary as doing so destroys sensor network applications. 
Sensor nodes achieve time synchronization by exchanging special messages. Thus, in 
defence, synchronization messages are protected by means of cryptography. However, 
insider attackers are still a source of threat.  
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Stealthy Attack: This strategy was first addressed by Perrig et al. [64]. In a sensor 
network in which aggregation of sensor data is required, sensors, including the 
aggregators, may lie about their measurements or their aggregation results. This attack 
works at the application level to prompt the base station to accept wrong information.  
 
Traffic Analysis: This term usually refers to the process of inferring information 
about the communication of an encrypted network. Sensor networks follow a special 
pattern of communication, which enables attackers to learn, for example, where 
information is destined. Unencrypted routing information and addresses make traffic 
analysis much easier.  
Deng et al., in [65], address the problem of detecting a base station through 
traffic analysis; once a base station is detected and so attacked, an adversary can 
render the whole network useless. One way to reveal the base station’s location is 
through a rate monitoring attack. The underlying idea is that the number of packets 
increases the closer they get to the base station. All the attacker needs to do is trigger 
an event and trace where the packets propagate.  
 
 
Table 2 lists the types of attacks categorized by the layer they target. 
 
Table 2: Types of Attacks 
Layer Attack 
Application Layer Insider attacks   
Transport Layer time desynchronization, flooding 
Network Layer Selective Forwarding, Black Hole, Ack. 
Spoofing, wormhole, sink hole. 
Data Link Layer Collision, Exhaustion 




3.2.4 Defending Mechanisms and Secure Protocols 
 
From the discussions above, it is clear that although employing security 
measures is challenging in such a resource-constraint environment, doing so is 
essential for the operability and survivability of sensor networks. Sensors must have 
the ability to authenticate a sender’s identity (source authentication), receive all 
messages intended for it (availability), ensure that messages are not altered or 
repeated (integrity and freshness), and, optionally, prevent an adversary from 
revealing the contents of messages (confidentiality). Finally, access to the network 
must be restricted only to legitimate nodes.  
Research has been growing tremendously in this area recently, trying to 
develop secure protocols for wireless sensor networks. Many of the researchers 
propose adding optimised security mechanisms, e.g., cryptographic tools, on top of 
the existing protocols. They argue that such techniques produce sufficiently secure 
algorithms with less cost as they reuse existing sensor network protocols. On the other 
hand, others stress that unless protocols are redesigned from the ground up, no 
security can be fully guaranteed. Obviously, some of the old protocols that were not 
designed with security in mind are hard or sometimes impossible to integrate with 
security measures. Another difficulty is linked to attacks coming from the inside. 
Insider attackers require smart mechanisms that are beyond the capability of 
cryptography. Finally, different attacks target different layers as can be seen from the 
discussion above. A secure protocol designer has to consider the layer in question 
(Table 2).  
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All in all, secure protocols must achieve security requirements, taking into 
account all the hardware obstacles, the existence of insider attacks, and the proper 
layer to be secured against a certain attack. In the following sections, defence 
mechanisms ([33],[2]) and several secure protocols suggested in the literature are 
presented. 
Avoiding jamming attacks requires design tuning and is usually costly. 
Ideally, the base station should learn about jamming in a certain area, e.g., by letting 
the jammed nodes inform their non-jammed neighbours and those, in turn, pass this 
information on to the base station. Many techniques are suggested, for example, 
spread spectrum, switching to a low power cycle, changing to Infra Red or optical 
instead of radio frequency. However, all these solutions require extra cost. 
Tampering can be avoided using tamper resistant packaging at extra cost. 
Otherwise, sensor nodes should be programmed in such a way as to erase sensitive 
data if a node is captured.  
Collision as an attack is almost impossible to mitigate. The best way is to 
design the data link layer to be able to detect the collision attack and employ stronger 
error correction schemes.  
Most outsider attacks can be prevented through simple cryptographic means, 
e.g., link layer encryption and authentication. Selective Forwarding, Sinkhole, Black 
Hole, Sybil attacks, acknowledgment spoofing, and de-synchronization are not 
possible because the attacker cannot join the network. Nevertheless, if the attacker 
manages to compromise some nodes, another level of protection will be necessary. 
For example, multiple paths should be provided to reduce the impact of selective 
forwarding. With Sybil attacks, nodes have to ensure the identity of other nodes they 
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are in contact with, for example, by having unique keys so that a compromised node 
cannot claim different identities.  
In the case of Hello Flood attacks, cryptography does not solve the problem 
because an attacker can replay an encrypted Hello packet in another area of the 
network and still create the same harm. To resolve the problem, nodes should verify 
the bi-directionality of a link before marking the station that is sending Hello 
messages as parent. 
Wormhole and Sinkhole attacks seem to be the most difficult ones to mitigate 
because they both use out-of-band communication channels. Karlof and Wagner, in 
[2], suggest that geographic routing shows promise in defending specifically against 
these two attacks because packets are routed towards the physical location of the base 
station. If an out-of-radio-range route is advertised, nodes will mark that route as an 
attack. 
Perrig et al., in [31], pioneered the construction of symmetric cryptographic 
security tools optimised for sensor networks, Secure Network Encryption Protocol 
(SNEP) and the “micro” version of Time, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant 
Authentication Protocol (µTESLA). These two tools can be seen as the building 
blocks for sensor protocols and applications. 
SNEP provides data confidentiality, two-party authentication, and weak and 
strong data freshness. Confidentiality is achieved through encryption of data 
concatenated with a counter value to ensure semantic security (different cipher texts 
for the same plain text). Two-party authentication and data authentication are realized 
by a MAC function that takes as input the shared key between the two nodes and a 
counter value. This counter value also has an important role in preventing replay 
attack.   
 51
µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast messages. In sensor networks, the 
base station is required to send packets to all nodes, e.g., routing beacons, queries, or 
reprogramming of the entire network. Using µTESLA to send an authenticated 
packet, the base station hashes the packet with a key that is not known to any node, 
including the recipients and, of course, the adversary. Nodes buffer the packet for a 
certain time until the key is disclosed by the base station. Through a key chain 
mechanism, nodes can verify the correctness of the disclosed key.  
One problem with their proposed protocols is the use of a master key that is 
distributed to the entire network at the initial setup. Such a scheme weakens the 
security level because compromise of the master key may lead to compromise of the 
entire network. 
Similar to SPINS work, TinySec [32], proposed by Wagner et al., secures the 
link layer in sensor networks; that is, it prevents unauthorized packets from joining 
the network even for a single hop. TinySec, specifically, works on a TinyOS 
operating system and supports two security options: authenticate encryption 
(TinySec-AE), in which data is encrypted and then the whole packet is hashed with 
MAC, and authentication only (Tiny-Ath), in which only MAC is computed for the 
packet. The authors’ goal is to achieve the minimum overhead possible in terms of the 
secured packet size, which hence leads to less power dissipation. The default size of a 
packet in TInyOS is 36 bytes. They managed to create an authenticated message of 
only 1 byte overhead and an encrypted and authenticated message of 5 bytes 
overhead. 
Karlof and Wagner, in [2], conduct an in-depth study of the current state of 
security in sensor networks. They investigate all possible attacks against routing 
protocols and suggest defense mechanisms for them. Furthermore, the authors analyze 
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several common routing algorithms, such as TinyOS, Directed Diffusion, Geographic 
routing, LEACH, concluding that all these protocols are insecure and pose significant 
challenges. They recommend, therefore, designing routing protocols with security in 
mind from the start. Cryptography (link layer encryption and authentication) helps 
achieve a good level of security in routing algorithms; however, it is not the complete 
solution as can be proven in the case of Sinkhole attacks, Wormholes, and insider 
attacks.  
Srivastave et al., in [66], define three levels of communication security, which 
map to three classes of data: mobile code, node location, and application specific data, 
ordered from high security sensitivity to low. Each level of security corresponds to a 
different level of security strength. The goal of layering security is to save energy on 
cryptographic algorithms since they consume different amounts of resources. 
Avancha et al., in [38], move up the protocol architecture to address security 
in the application and network layers. Specifically, they develop techniques to secure 
certain routing and data movement approaches in directed diffusion [39] and SPIN 
[40]. The specific application considered is perimeter protection, which involves a lot 
of monitoring and data transmission. Added to symmetric cryptographic tools, their 
technique detects aberrant nodes for elimination. 
An issue yet to be addressed is the possibility of achieving end-to-end security. 
Data originating at a certain node should be received at the base station intact. If such 
data is encrypted, for example, then it should be decrypted nowhere but at the base 
station. Nevertheless, in-network processing is important for efficient data handling as 
to reduce redundant packets. In this context, the next section addresses information 
aggregation and security issues. 
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3.3 Information Aggregation 
 
Sensor networks typically consist of a large number of nodes. Hundreds or 
thousands are common. As the size of a network grows, it is obviously expected that 
the amount of data will grow proportionally. Sensors, due to their computational 
constraints, are not able to route or process such an enormous amount of traffic, but 
luckily do not need to do so. Smart techniques simplify the task by providing a 
summary of the results that a number of individual sensors come up with. For 
example, sensors that watch the same physical phenomenon are likely to provide 
similar information. They can send their raw data to a single node, where 
summarization can take place. 
In other words, a group of sensors send raw information to a specific node that 
takes care of aggregation and provides smaller-in-size and more meaningful 
messages. This node is called an aggregator. The next step is to deliver this message 
to a central station as the final stop.  
Aggregation is quite useful in reality. It offers a better utilization of bandwidth 
and battery by reducing the number of messages travelling around in a sensor 
network; it leads to more accurate, reliable, and meaningful data, and it helps prolong 
the network lifetime. However, aggregation is particularly vulnerable to attacks. At 
the level of the regular nodes, the existence of Byzantine nodes can lead to inaccurate 
aggregation results. What is worse is that when the aggregator itself is compromised, 
then the whole sensing task becomes meaningless. Therefore, secure information 
aggregation techniques are crucial to the success of a sensor network. 
In the context of aggregation, the next section is an introduction to various 
ordinary techniques proposed for achieving data aggregation in sensor networks, 
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followed by another section addressing security issues and enumerating secure 
aggregation techniques. 
 
3.3.1 Data Aggregation Techniques 
 
Before discussing security in this field, it is important to consider data 
aggregation techniques in general. The first underlying concept is clustering, which is 
proposed in the literature to allow expansion of sensor networks to a large number of 
sensors and to preserve energy to the maximum. In clustering, some nodes are elected 
as cluster heads, whose responsibility becomes summarizing or combining messages 
coming from regular sensors in the corresponding clusters, thereby providing less 
detailed information to distant nodes. [41[42][43][44] are examples of such clustering 
algorithms, and are summarized below. 
The Voting-based Clustering Algorithm (VCA) [41] selects cluster heads by 
considering two physical properties related to the nodes themselves, the residual 
energy, and to the network, the topology. Nodes are initially assumed to learn about 
the existence of neighbours and their corresponding residual energy through 
frequently sent beacon messages. The algorithm lets each node form messages and 
send them out to all neighbouring nodes.  The vote messages that are coming from 
different nodes carry different weights, which are summed up at a receiving node to 
conclude whether that node can become a cluster head. A node with more neighbours 
and higher residual energy than others is more likely to accumulate more votes and 
get a higher weight.  
In LEACH [42], each node calculates its chance of becoming a cluster head 
according to a probability function. The function takes as inputs the estimated optimal 
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number of clusters (energy consumption for communication is involved here) and the 
total number of nodes. The node with the highest probability value announces itself as 
the cluster head, and all other nodes that do not elect themselves select their nearest 
cluster head to join. LEACH distributes the load between the nodes by restricting a 
node to becoming a cluster head only once in one round, hence preserving energy. 
HEED [43] is similar to LEACH in that it periodically calls on the clustering 
algorithm to elect a new cluster head. However, in HEED, each node has a probability 
value that determines the likelihood of its becoming a cluster head considering mainly 
its residual energy. Sensors that are not covered by cluster heads double their 
probability value until a value of 1 is reached. This process iterates until all nodes are 
either marked as cluster heads or as regular nodes belonging to a cluster head.  
WCA [44] and DCA [45] incorporate more parameters inferred from internal 
node’s properties, which are used in determining cluster heads. Specifically, they 
suggest considering a node’s mobility, degree, residual energy, and distance to 
neighbouring nodes as inputs to the weighing function. Each contributing property is 
weighted by a factor to make the algorithm flexible according to the application 
requirements.   
Kulik et al., in [40], develop a protocol, called Sensor Protocols for 
Information via Negotiation (SPIN), to solve the three broadcast deficiencies. They 
are Implosion (reception of multiple copies of the same message), Overlap (nodes 
geographically covering overlapping areas), and Resource Blindness (nodes being 
ignorant of the energy residual). With SPINS, the number of messages propagated in 
a sensor network is lessened. The protocol concept is based on negotiation among 
nodes before they transmit data. The researchers propose a three-step handshake 
protocol (ADV-REQ-DATA). In the first step, a node advertises through an ADV 
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message that it has new data for transmission. Data is uniquely described by a 
descriptor, referred to as meta-data. The receiving nodes check the ADV message to 
see whether they have already received or requested the advertised data. If not, a 
request response (REQ) is sent back. Data messages are finally disseminated.     
In [46], Hong et al. develop an SQL-like language, called Tiny Aggregation 
(TAG). TAG assumes a sensor network of hierarchical setup. Queries are pushed 
down to the network to reach a certain area or certain nodes that are declared in the 
query message. In response to the query and according to its attributes (type of 
aggregation function, area of interest, and time interval between readings), sensors 
send their readings to parents, where aggregation takes place. Data is forwarded up 
the tree and is aggregated at every parent until it reaches the final destination, the base 
station. The authors give five examples of such queries: COUNT, MIN, MAX, SUM, 
and AVERAGE. However, they argue that the list can be extended to satisfy different 
applications. 
Directed diffusion is another data-gathering paradigm, proposed by Siva et al. 
in [39]. The proposed protocol is based on a network of nodes that coordinate among 
one another to provide collectively sensed information in accordance with operator 
interest. In directed diffusion, data are named using a set of attribute-value pairs. As 
the operator initiates interest in a certain sensing task, that interest is disseminated 
throughout the network to set up gradients. Gradients specify the direction for the 
gathered data to follow next. Finally, events that match the interest start flowing to the 
interest originator through one or multiple gradient paths. To save energy, data in this 
paradigm is aggregated along the path. 
More advanced aggregation techniques are found in [47], proposed by 
Shrivastava et. al. The authors argue that simple types of query such as SUM, 
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COUNT, AVG, and MIN/MAX are not enough in many applications. They propose 
more complex aggregation functions such as the median, the most frequent data value 
(consensus value), a histogram of the data distribution, as well as range queries. In 
their work, they stress that such new aggregation functions are not exact. However, 
theoretical guarantees on the approximation quality are provided. 
 
3.3.2 Secure Data Aggregation 
 
As per the discussion above, with standard aggregation techniques, it is 
assumed that sensors are trustworthy, and that having more sensors should provide 
better results. Unfortunately, those techniques overlook the fact that some sensors 
may become Byzantine, which will render the network useless.  
For that reason, secure data aggregation techniques become vital for the 
success of sensor network. 
 Hu. et. al., in [48], address the problem of how to enable secure 
information aggregation. They consider a network consisting of a powerful base 
station and a large number of simple sensors. Sensors are spread out enough to allow 
multi-hop communication between regular sensors and the base station. Each sensor 
possesses a unique key and shares it with the base station, allowing symmetric 
cryptographic primitives to be implemented. 
The researchers basically propose the use of μTESLA protocol for security 
[31]. In μTESLA, asymmetry is achieved through delayed disclosure of secret keys. 
Similarly here, a node is able to verify the child’s data validity (through MACs) only 
after the key is revealed by the base station. The point is that, in the worst case, a node 
can only lie about its own reading, not another’s.  
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This protocol scales to a hierarchal network, but it is costly in terms of the 
delay that results from the waiting time before a key is disclosed when data 
verification takes place at a node. The long waiting time makes it more difficult to 
implement this protocol especially in large networks or those that require frequent 
readings. The other problem is that this protocol may fail to ensure data integrity if 
two nodes in the hierarchy, parent and child, are compromised. 
Perrig et. al., in [64], discuss secure aggregation in the sense that a user 
accepts the data with high probability if the aggregated result is within a desired 
boundary; otherwise the user detects cheating with high probability and therefore 
rejects the result if it is outside the boundary. 
The researchers start with the assumption that a compromised node, being 
under full control of the attacker, can commit any sort of harm, including denial-of-
service. However, they focus mainly on stealthy attacks, in which the attacker’s goal 
is to make the user accept false aggregate results. The type of network they deal with 
is assumed to have a large number of simple sensors and one powerful node that does 
the aggregation task.  
To prevent stealthy attacks, they propose a three-stage protocol, named 
Aggregate-Commit-Prove. In the first stage, aggregation takes place. The aggregator 
collects raw data from the sensors and computes the aggregation result. 
Authentication is achieved at this level as each node possesses a key that is shared 
with the aggregator so as to prevent impersonation.  
In the second stage, Commit, the aggregator is responsible for committing to 
the collected data, that is, to ensure that the aggregator actually uses the data collected 
from the sensors. To achieve this, they suggest a Merkle Hash-Tree construction [49], 
in which the aggregator calculates a hash value for every sensor’s measurement. The 
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tree is built using those hash values by hashing at each of the tree nodes the 
concatenation string of the node’s children. The root of the tree is called the 
commitment of the collected data. 
In the final stage, Prove, the aggregator and the home server establish a hand-
shake protocol to prove that the aggregation results are correct. 
In terms of cryptography and communication, symmetric cryptographic 
functions are used here for authentication, integrity, and encryption. Each sensor has a 
unique identification and shares a separate key with the home server and with the 
aggregator. In fact, they store only master keys, while the sensors produce 
communication keys by hashing the node id with the master key, i.e., HMACK(node 
id). 
This solution focuses on obtaining the best approximation of the aggregation 
results with the existence of Byzantine nodes rather than on identifying the 
misbehaving nodes. In fact, with this setup, compromising a single node will make 
key material for all the nodes available to an attacker. Furthermore, compromising 
only a single node in addition to the aggregator enables the attacker to make all sorts 
of attacks, including stealthy attacks, which the SIA protocol is mainly trying to 
defend against because in such a case, the aggregator can learn the key material of the 
nodes and thus fake the whole Merkle hash tree. 
Another problem is related to scalability. As the number of regular sensors 
increases, the computations involved, such as the construction of the Merkle hash-
tree, become more challenging in terms of processing power. 
In [50], Deng et al. propose having witness nodes to achieve secure data 
aggregation, that is, whether the data fusion to the base station is valid. In their 
scheme, each sensor, including the witness nodes, shares a unique key with the base 
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station. The idea is that witness nodes, being in the same radio range as the 
aggregator, also perform data aggregation and compute the corresponding MACs 
using their keys. Then they send those MACs to the aggregator, which, in turn, 
forwards them to the base station. Then, as the base station has received the aggregate 
result from the aggregator along with a number of corresponding MACs, it is better 
able to verify the correctness of the fused data. 
Finally, Wu et al., in [51], develop a secure aggregation mechanism that lets 
child nodes monitor father nodes in a tree topological setup to report any cheating. A 
child node is assumed to be able to listen to all messages sent from its siblings to its 
father node. To do so, child nodes build an aggregation tree, called Secure 
Aggregation Tree (SAT), by propagation of invitation messages. A node that receives 
an invitation message marks the sender as the father and then broadcasts similar 
invitation messages to cover all the nodes in the area. To detect cheating, each child 
node, acting like a watchdog, keeps observing all the messages sent to its father and 
the aggregate messages sent from the father to its grandfather as well. If a node’s 
father sends out a value that is significantly different from a correct aggregate value, 
the node will raise a weighted alert, indicating the severity of the suspected cheating. 
As a result, when the number of alerts from different nodes exceeds a certain 
threshold value, SAT is rebuilt so that a misbehaving father is excluded. The 
interesting feature in this technique is the light use of cryptography; for example, only 
alert messages are authenticated. On the other hand, the shortcoming is that leaf nodes 
cannot be checked.  
In conclusion, the unattended nature of sensor networks makes them prone to 
many types of attacks, including some unique ones, such as insider attacks. When a 
node is compromised, an adversary can easily inject false data into the network, 
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resulting in severe consequences: distorted data integrity, depleted battery power, and 
degraded bandwidth utilization. However, designing a sensor network that is able to 
detect false data injected by compromised nodes is a great research challenge because 
compromised nodes act as part of the network by possessing cryptographic keys. 
When aggregation is required, the problem is compounded because nodes legitimately 
can alter the data for the sake of decreasing redundancy. Consequently, nodes cannot 
differentiate between cheating and aggregation. The next chapter discusses the 
method proposed for detecting injected false data; it shows how to filter out false data, 





4CHAPTER 4 SECURE DATA AGGREGATION 
 
 
This chapter presents the proposed secure data aggregation approach that is 
robust to Byzantine nodes. This approach is able to detect Byzantine sensors, assign 
trust values to each sensor, and determine when to apply cryptography. The chapter is 
organized as follows:     
1) System Model and Assumptions: This section explains some basic 
assumptions about the sensor network setup. Furthermore, it states the thesis 
goal from a security point of view. 
2) Solution Framework: This part presents a strategy to Byzantine behaviour 
detection. It demonstrates how false data is discovered at the aggregator node 
and how the proposed system assigns trust values to sensors accordingly. 
3) Performance Analysis: This section evaluates the performance of the proposed 
secure aggregation method. Performance evaluation involves simulation 
results, complexity analysis, and energy savings. 
 
4.1 SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Consider the scenario of a network of wireless sensors deployed in a certain 
area to perform measurements. Because the sensors are assumed to be simple, low in 
power consumption, and short in communication range, there exist intermediate nodes 
with relatively higher processing capabilities called aggregators. Upon a query from 
the home server, sensors perform their measurements and report to the aggregator, 
which, in turn, performs some processing and eventually sends the result to the home 
server (Figure  4-1). 
The goal is to detect and avoid possible Byzantine nodes, those which report 
wrong information to the aggregator. Node assessment takes place at the aggregator 
















The following notations are used in the description of the secure aggregation 
procedure. 
• n is the number of nodes. 
• S1,……,Sn are the regular nodes. 
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• H is the home server or base station. 
• A is the aggregator. 
• Xi is the value reported by Si. 
• KH,Si  is the shared key between sensor i and the home server. 
• KA,Si  is the shared key between the aggregator and home server. 
• m1|m2 denotes the concatenation of two messages, m1 and m2. 
• E(K,m) refers to the encryption of message m using key K. 
• MAC(K,m) is the message authentication code of  message m with key K. 
• Si  A: m means a sensor Si sends a message m to the aggregator A. In a 
similar manner, A Si:m and H Si:m are defined. 






















4.1.2 Security Goal and Assumptions 
 
The goal is to protect the wireless sensor network from Byzantine nodes. The 
main threat considered here is that from malicious data, which can propagate in a 
network in many ways, for instance, through node compromise, or by physically 
spoofing the sensing element, e.g., heating it up. Our goal is to protect the wireless 
sensor network from Byzantine nodes, identify them, and filter them out. Byzantine 
nodes, by definition, include compromised nodes that participate as part of the 
network. A compromised node is completely under the control of an adversary and is 
assumed to act skilfully. In this context, a skilful attack refers to the ability of an 
adversary to lie about its measurement at times and simply to be honest at other times. 
An adversary’s goal, in attacking nodes, is to severely deviate the final aggregated 
result from the true value.  
In this work, The adversary is assumed to be polynomially bounded, which 
leads to the assumption that compromising a sensor is not an easy task. Therefore, 
only some of the sensors can fall under an attack – say 30% of the regular nodes. That 
is considered a safe number. 
Further, corrupted sensors may collude as they can be controlled by the same 
attacker. Collusion, in fact, is not very likely to happen because sensors are 
synchronized with the aggregator so that they report their measurements at the same 
time; however, this assumption is made to strengthen the notion of security. 
The aggregators, in this setup, are regarded as trusted nodes. The number of 
aggregators is far less than the number of regular nodes. Hence, more can be spent on 
them to enhance their security abilities, for example, enclose them in high levels of 
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tamper-resistant packaging or mount them in places where high security standards can 
be guaranteed. In addition to that, aggregators have heavier duties than other regular 
sensors because they act as centres to process data coming from other sensors. If 
aggregators die, then the whole network dies. Therefore, more processing power and 
more energy are required for aggregating nodes.  
 
 
4.2 THE SECURE DATA AGGREGATION PROTOCOL  
 
4.2.1 Key Setup 
 
Initially, cryptographic tools and secret keys are installed on all sensors; 
however, the use of them is avoided until misbehaviour is detected.  
As concluded in the discussion in Chapter 3 on symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography, the former is more appealing in such a resource-constrained 
environment. Therefore, each node possesses two keys, preloaded before deployment. 
One is shared with the aggregator and the other one is shared with the home server. 
Regarding identification, every node owns a unique ID. 
For efficient use of keys and storage space, the home server and the aggregator 
do not store separate keys for every single sensor. Instead, each of them, the home 
server and the aggregator, shares unique keys with the regular nodes in the form of a 
single master key. That is, the home server stores the master key KH, and each node 
stores MAC(KH,node ID). Similarly the aggregator stores the master key KA, and 
every nodes stores MAC(KA,node ID). Although nodes derive their unique keys from 
the same master key, a compromise of one node does not spread to others. In other 
words, learning the master key from the node key is not possible because of the one-
way property that the MAC function holds. With this technique, the home server and 
the aggregator are able to compute the keys they share with the regular nodes by using 
the master key to hash the node ID. In the same manner, the hashing technique is 
further extended to derive more computationally-independent keys for encryption and 
data authentication. Figure  4-3 shows our procedure for key derivation. 
 







Figure  4-3 Deriving keys from the master secret key 
 
 
If a new node is added to the system, the corresponding key is added in the 
system, to the home server, and to the aggregator. However, for security reasons, the 
aggregator key can be changed and disseminated to all the nodes when needed. Nodes 
communicate with the home server through the aggregator. In parts of our 
communication protocol, the nodes exchange special information with the home 
server using the home server node keys. Even though communication takes place 
through the aggregator, obviously the latter is not able to reveal such information. 
Communication between neighbouring nodes is not part of the current set-up, so pair-
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wise key sharing is not required. In certain applications pair-wise communication is 
involved. Protocols such as the ones discussed in [14,52,53], and [54] can be 
implemented for that purpose. 
 
4.2.2 Protocol Overview 
 
Below is an abstract overview of the message exchange that takes place 
between the three main components – the home server, aggregator, and regular 
sensors. The steps demonstrated here are elaborated on in later sections. 
The home server (or base station) initiates the sensing process by sending out 
a broadcast message to certain sensors that are located in the area of interest. Through 
the broadcast, nodes, including suspicious (less trustworthy) nodes themselves, also 
learn which sensors are less trustworthy.  
 
1. Regular sensors then report back measurements through the aggregator as 
messages cannot reach to the home server directly. 
2. The aggregator processes the received measurements. In addition to the 
aggregation functionality provided, it identifies outlying sensors through an 
outlier detection algorithm. At the same time, it assigns trustworthiness values 
to every sensor to keep track of the sensors’ performance. The aggregation 
result along with Byzantine sensor IDs are reported to the home server. 
3. According to the trust values, certain decisions are made, e.g., to force nodes 
to run certain cryptographic functions or to eliminate a node completely.  
 
Steps 3 and 4 can been seen in the following sections in three main points:  
• Outlier Detection: the procedure used to discover misbehaving nodes. 
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• Trust Establishment: a mathematical model to derive an appropriate trust 
measure. 
• Communication Messages: a demonstration of the ways different 
messages are formatted showing how cryptographic functions, when 
needed, fit here. 
 
4.2.3 OUTLIER DETECTION 
 
Intuitively, without malicious behaviour and according to the central limit 
theorem, which states that the sum of many independent and identically-distributed 
random variables with finite variances will tend to follow normal distribution, 
measurements reported by sensors comply with this definition, so they appear to the 
aggregator to follow normal distribution. The existence of one sort of attack or 
another makes some measurements differ from the rest. 
Luckily, those malicious attacks can be treated as outliers, which are a well-
studied problem in statistics. From [55], the problem of outliers is defined as “an 
observation that deviates so much from the other observations as to arouse suspicions 
that it was generated by a different mechanism.”  
Many outlier detection schemes have been introduced in the literature. 
Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate (GESD) [56] is among them, and has 
proved to perform very well under various conditions, as argued in [55]. Many papers 
such as [57],[58], use GESD and conclude that it outperforms other detection 
procedures. The following section explains how GESD many-outlier detection works 
followed by a section that demonstrates how this detection algorithm would fit with 
our problem. Recall that outliers for us represent a possible attack. 
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4.2.3.1 Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate Algorithm (GESD) 
 
GESD is a statistical procedure introduced by B. Rosner [56] and is based on 




Given a set, X, of n data samples where X∈{x1,x2,……., xn}, the mean of X is 
denoted as x’, and the standard deviation of X is denoted as s. 
Let Ti (the corresponding T-value or xi) = |xi-x’| / s , where i = 1,2, … ,n. 
Let xj be the observation that leads to the largest T-value. Then, xj is an outlier 
if Tj exceeds a tabled critical value λ. Otherwise if Tj does not exceed the critical 
value λ, it may be concluded that the test finds no outliers. 
If the test finds an outlier, that outlier is filtered out, and test continues the 
same process with the remaining (n-1) points to look for further outliers. 
 
GESD Test  
GESD is a modified version of the ESD test and can identify multiple outliers 
in the data set. Before analysis, two parameters must be specified, the probability of 
incorrectly declaring the existence of outliers when no outliers exist (sensitivity of the 
process), λI, and an upper bound on the estimate number of outliers, Nu. 
Formally, λi is the two-sided 100α percent critical value and can be calculated 
from the following formula. 
 





where i = 1, …, Nu
Tv,p is the 100*p percentage point from the t distribution with v degrees of 
freedom, and p = 1- [α / 2(n-I+1)]. 
Given α, n, and Nu, the critical values λi, where i = 1,…, Nu, can be calculated 
beforehand. In other words, the probability is adjusted so that the number of warnings 
about the outliers is kept to an acceptable level. The upper bound must be less than 
half of the number of data samples, i.e., Nu ≤ 0.5 (n-1), since the number of outliers 
cannot form the majority, as that would negate the original definition of outliers. 
 
Algorithm: Identifying outliers with GESD 
Input: Nu, X, λ 
 Begin loop (I=1,2,3,…,Nu) 
  Compute average x’ of elements in set X 
  Compute standard deviation s of elements in set X 
  If s = 0 continue (next i) 
  Find ith extreme studentized deviate Ti 
  Calculate ith critical value λi 
  If Ti > λi then outlier 
   Move element xi from set X to outlier list 
 End loop 
 Return outlier list, non-outlier list 













 Calculate robust estimate of the standard deviation (srobust) from set of non-
outlier list 
 
4.2.3.2 Choosing Nu (Maximum Estimated Number of Byzantine Nodes) 
 
It is important that to choose Nu carefully as it plays a primary role in GESD. 
Too small Nu could mean some Byzantine nodes would not be reported. On the the 
hand, too large Nu would make GESD waste time checking nodes that are in reality 
good ones (honest). 
According to Becher et al. [60], launching attacks based on physical node 
capture is not easy and requires expert knowledge, costly equipment, and other 
resources. Removal of a sensor from a network can be noticed by its neighbours and 
the node itself. 
Wagner, in [61], argues also that the adversary's capabilities are not unlimited. 
Some cost or luck will be required for each node that the adversary wishes to 
compromise. Therefore, he suggests the assumption that an adversary can 
compromise only a limited number of nodes but not half of the network. A network 
that is robust to one or two or three compromised nodes indicates a network that is in 
good shape. 
 Accordingly, this work does not consider an extreme case, half of the nodes, 
nor does it assume that only a very few of the nodes are compromised. The percentage 
30% is a reasonable assumption. For example, with a network of 20 sensors, an 
assumption of up to six possible compromised nodes is sensible. 
 
4.2.3.3 Choosing α  
 
Rosner, in [56], demonstrates the GESD algorithm by assuming three different 
values for α: 0.05, 0.01, and 0.005. The symbol α represents the percentage of the tail 
portion’s distribution that is far from the mean. The greater the percentage value, the 
greater the number of points that can be included. From the security point of view, 




Figure  4-4  Student's t Distribution 
 
 
4.2.3.4 The Role of GESD in Evaluating Sensors  
 
GESD is the first step towards identifying Byzantine sensors. When 
information {x1, …, xn} is reported to the aggregator from different sensors in the 
network {S1,…, Sn}, some of the measurements deviate from the true value as a 
reflection of Byzantine behaviour. Regardless of the aggregation function, the 
aggregator analyzes the received readings and points out the extreme ones (sensor 




4.2.4 Trust Establishment 
 
This section describes how trust measurement is assigned to individual 
sensors. First of all, an important question is where should sensors assessment take 
place?  Possibility number one is to let the aggregator transfer the aggregation result 
along with the sensor IDs of outlying sensors to the home server, which is where the 
trust value is calculated and updated and a decision is taken accordingly as to whether 
to force some of the nodes to use cryptography for future communication or even to 
eliminate them from the network. Possibility number two is to let the aggregator do 
the complete job – assign and update trust values and decides on the appropriate 
punishment for deviant nodes. The first setup seems appealing because it allows 
future, more general, expansion of the secure aggregation protocol by involving the 
aggregator itself in the assessment. This would suggest that the aggregator is not 
completely trusted, which suits some sensor network scenarios. The second setup 
suits some other scenarios as well, in which aggregators are considered resource-
enhanced stations, so every aggregator assesses its directly reporting nodes ( 4.1.2). 
This setup has the advantage of the ability to apply the security scheme on a 
hierarchical aggregation network. For now let us assume that the aggregator is the one 
that computes trust and makes the decisions.  
After calculating the aggregation result and identifying outlying sensors, the 
aggregator assigns a trust value to each regular sensor and keeps updating this value 
according to the sensors’ performance. The aggregator makes the decision as to when 
a sensor should use cryptography and when it should be eliminated from the network. 
Below is a demonstration of how trust measure is derived. 
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To begin, let us first find a suitable definition of trust. There are several 
definitions of trust in the literature. According to Linag and Shi, in [62], It is “the 
subjective probability by which an individual A expects that another individual B 
performs a given action as good as expected.” That means “A” would be applying a 
probabilistic measure as to how likely ‘B’ is to do certain tasks properly. A metric, 
hence, is needed to measure that possibility. Sun et al., in [59], take us steps ahead 
towards information theoretic concepts by saying “trust is a measure of uncertainty”; 
as such, trust value can be measured by entropy.  
Therefore, trust is a function of entropy. Applying that definition to the matter 
of aggregation in sensor networks, trust determines how uncertain the aggregator is 
about the other nodes as to whether they would report good and honest measurements 
or not. In other words, the home server observes the performance of the nodes 
reporting to it, then derives and associates a trustworthiness value with each one of 
them.  
To formulate that, Sun et al., in [59], in studying the performance of ad hoc 
network routing protocols, propose a continuous function to determine trust. The 
following shows how they derived and used their trust model in their scenario, 
followed by a demonstration of how the equations and definitions are manipulated 
from its original context so that they adapt to our case. 
In an Ad Hoc network, packets get routed through multiple nodes. Assume 
that node “A,” called the subject, sends a set of packets to some destination through 
an intermediate node “B,” called the agent. Equation 1 calculates how much trust the 
subject A can have in the agent B to do a certain action, which is forwarding packets 
in this case. 
 











H(p)= -p log2(p) – (1-p) log2(1-p)                      … (2) 














Figure  4-5 - Trust as a function of entropy 
 
where  
• T{subject; agent; action} (also written TAB) is the trust value that the 
subject A holds for the agent B. 
• H(p) is Shannon entropy. 
• p: P{subject; agent; action} is the probability estimate that the subject 
holds for the agents as to how likely the latter is to perform the action next 
time. 
 
From Figure  4-5, when probability, p, equals 1, the aggregator is certain about 
the honesty of the node, and trust is at its maximum value, which is 1. On the other 
hand, a probability of 0 means that the aggregator is certain about the dishonesty of 
the node, and hence, trust is at its lowest value, which is -1. Moreover, when the 
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probability is ½, trust becomes zero, which means that the aggregator has no trust in 
the node.  
It is important to show how Sun et al. calculate the probability. According to 
their routing scenario, each mobile node holds a trust value for each of the other nodes 
in the network as per the following: a node calculates the trust of forwarding packets, 
that is, how trustworthy an agent is in forwarding packets. The value is derived from 
the number of successfully delivered packets, K, and the total number of initially sent 
packets, N, according to Equation 3 or Equation 4 (taking into account the time of 
observation). If a node holds no trust value for a certain destination, then trust is 
established by getting recommendation values from other nodes in the network. 
Figure  4-6 depicts a typical setup of mobile nodes. For example, A wants to send 
packets through D, so it first updates the trust value associated with D from its past 
observations and from other nodes’ recommendations.  
 
    P{subject: agent, action} =        …(3) k
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Now, moving back to aggregation in sensor networks, The above formulations 
are manipulated so that they fit into the problem and become part of the overall 
solution. For that, let us assume that the aggregator represents the subject while the 
regular nodes represent the agents. The action is the measurement provided every 
time by each node. Therefore, the scenario changes thus: the aggregator identifies 
sensors whose measurements are classified as bad to the home server. The home 
server updates k, the number of good measurements reported by a certain sensor, and 
N, the total number of readings. 
Equations 3 and 4 can be used in calculating the trust value. However, they do 
not completely catch all the issues connected with aggregation, for example the 
severity of punishment when a node is suspected of misbehaviour or how this 
misbehaviour is linked with the environment in terms of the probability of nodes 
being attacked and compromised. If a sensor network is deployed in an area that 
requires higher security measures, then calculation of trust should reflect that. For 
example, trust values drop fast but build relatively slowly. For that reason a 
punishment factor is introduced (equations below).  
 

















where  K is the Count of good measurements 
N is the Total number of measurements 








X’robust, Srobust are calculated from algorithm 1. 
β is the Punishment factor (β = (1-0.6PA) )       …(6)  
PA is the probability of attack 
 
Equations 1 and 2 then follow to obtain the trust value in terms of entropy. 
H(p)= -p log2(p) – (1-p) log2(1-p)                      











4.2.4.1 Threshold and Probability of Attack 
 
Trust ranges between –1 and 1 (Equation 1) with an initial value of zero 
(pr=0.5). In this scheme, different threshold values can be introduced to make the 
system more dynamic and more flexible to designer discretion. For example, with 
multiple threshold values, each of which defines a required level of security (e.g., a 
longer key, a stronger cryptographic function, or other methods), as a sensor’s trust 
value drops below a certain threshold value, that level of security is demanded. The 
worst case occurs when the trust value is lower than the lowest threshold value, 
resulting in removing the node from the network. For simplicity, two threshold values 
are maintained: the first one defines when to enable cryptography and the second one 
defines when to remove a node.   
In Equation 5, β (punishment factor) is plugged in to make the equation 
sensitive to bad behaviour. Probability of attack PA( β=1 - 0.6 PA ) defines how likely 
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a node is to be compromised. By setting PA to a certain value, sensitivity increases or 
decreases accordingly.  
 
Figure  4-7 demonstrates a hypothetical scenario of a node with different 
values for β. Trust keeps increasing for that node until it reports a measurement that 
does not comply with the consensus. At the measurement number 50, the trust drops 
abruptly. Probability of attack PA determines the severity of trust decrease. For 
example, for a PA as high as 0.9, trust drops below the threshold value in one shot. 
Next, good measurements are reported so that trust increases; however, the increase is 
slow. For the sake of security, trust is assumed to drop quickly and build slowly. 
 
 























4.2.5 Communication Messages 
 
This section introduces the packet format for the different communication 
messages that are sent among the three node types: regular sensors, aggregator, and 
the home server. The two protocols, SNEP (for data confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, and freshness) and µTESLA (for authenticated broadcast queries), are 
borrowed for the benefit of our secure aggregation approach with a slight 
modification. Chapter 2 introduces these two protocols, but for more details, refer to 
[14].   
 
4.2.5.1 Broadcast (Query Dissemination) 
 
In the process of query dissemination from the home server to the network, 
sensors need to learn mainly about the aggregation function, fAGG, they are to provide. 
Besides the aggregation function, a randomly generated number is attached to ensure 
freshness (prevent replaying). Several configuration parameters precede the query 
message to supply the receivers with the information required for authentication.  
Such information includes time duration, a time stamp (Ts) to provide time 
synchronization, a randomly generated number NH to provide freshness, and MAC tag 
to achieve authentication. Other fields related to the key disclosure include starting 
time Ti, time interval Tint, and the disclosure delay d.  
H S*: Ts|Ki|Ti|Tint|d, MAC (KH,Si, NH|Ts|Ki|Ti|Tint|d) 
 A number of query messages, following the previous setup message, can be 
sent out before disclosure of the secret key Kj. A query message may look like the 
following message. 
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H S*: Fagg, NH, MAC(Kj, Fagg|NH) 
 
4.2.5.2 Sensors to Aggregator 
 
Opposite to query dissemination, data aggregation flows starting from the 
regular nodes and ending at the home server. Again, in a trusted environment, sensors 
send simple packets that carry their IDs and readings to the aggregator. However, 
when cryptography is enforced, nodes encrypt the packets (if confidentiality is 
required) and add MAC tags to them. The secret key used here is the one shared 
between the node and the aggregator. The following shows the packet that a regular 
node, Si, sends to the aggregator. 
Si A: Si, E( KSi,A, Xi | NH) | MAC( KSi,A, Si| Xi| NH), 
where Xi is the data reported by node Si, and NH is a random number to identify the 
query and to prevent replay attacks. 
 
4.2.5.3 Aggregator to Home Server 
 
When the aggregator receives all the packets from all sensors, it first filters out 
outlier readings, assign trust values to each sensor, and then performs the aggregation. 
Before cryptography is switched on, the aggregator reports to the home server the 
aggregate result and the IDs of those sensors whose trustworthiness drops below the 
set threshold in a packet that looks like the following one: 
A H: A, Agg, Byzantine_count,Byzantine_IDs, NH 
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With encryption and authentication enabled, the aggregator first decrypts the 
data it receives from the regular sensors using keys it shares with them. Then it uses 
its shared key with the home server to form the following packet. 
A H: A, E(KAenc,H, Agg| Byzantine_count| Byzantine_IDs| NH)| 
MAC(KAmac,H, A| Agg|Byzantine_count| Byzantine_IDs| NH), 
 
where Byzantine refers to the nodes that have low trust values less than a threshold. 
NH is the same as the one used in the initial query message and in the packets 
reported by the regular nodes. 
 
4.3 Secure Hierarchical Aggregation 
 
If the sensor network is too large, which is common, then multiple 
aggregators, usually cooperating, are required to handle the entire network. Functions 
such as AVERAGE, MIN, and MAX do support hierarchical aggregation. That is, 
every aggregator performs the aggregation function on a subset of the nodes in the 
sensor network. The results are collectively sent to other aggregators for computing 
the same aggregation function again, and eventually deliver the final result to the 
home server (Figure  4-8).  
If hierarchical aggregation is required, my proposed approach is still 
applicable (Byzantine detection and trust assignment), but with a slight modification 
in the message format. Aggregators can still send messages to other aggregators (e.g. 
cluster heads) and, depending on the type of application, the first aggregator can 
decide whether the second one should perform aggregation or not. For that, 





Figure  4-8 Hierarchical Aggregation Network 
 
In technique number one, each aggregator processes only the information 
received from its direct sensor group and then sends that aggregate result straight up 
to the home server through other aggregators (e.g., inter-cluster communication). 
However, the latter forwards the aggregate message without performing any more 
aggregation. In this technique, pair-wise keys shared between one aggregator in the 
hierarchy (child) and the next one (parent) are not required. However, the parent 
aggregator needs to learn that it has to forward the aggregate packet intact. An extra 
flag bit (aggregate bit) is added in the message for every aggregator on the way to the 
home server to check. A bit of “0” indicates that no further aggregation is needed.  
The following shows the message format that an aggregator Achild sends to another 
 84
 85
aggregator Aparent. The first message is without cryptography while the second one 
encrypts and authenticates. 
 
Achild Aparent: Achild, 0, Agg, Byzantine_count,Byzantine_IDs, NH 
 
Achild Aparent: Achild,0, E(KAenc,H, Agg| Byzantine_count| 
Byzantine_IDs| NH)| MAC(KAmac,H, 0|Achild| Agg|Byzantine_count| 
Byzantine_IDs| NH) 
 
In technique number two, a global aggregation is required. That is, every 
aggregator performs aggregation on its group sensors as well as on the results 
received from other aggregators. Our approach adapts to this technique through a 
modification in the packet format, in the three fields: aggregate bit, count value, and 
pair-wise key sharing if cryptography is on. An aggregate bit of “1” indicates to the 
aggregator that further aggregation is required. The count value is also necessary to 
show how many aggregators have already contributed to the aggregated data before 
further aggregation can be applied. Regarding the key sharing between two 
aggregators in the hierarchy, the second one uses the key to decrypt the packet before 
carrying on with aggregation. Encryption here provides confidentiality and also 
authentication because keys are shared only between the two aggregator nodes. 
Several key management protocols have been suggested in the literature. As a matter 
of fact, the best way to bootstrap secure connections is public-key cryptography for 
symmetric setup. However, as explained in Chapter 2, public-key cryptography is not 
a viable solution in such a resource-constrained environment. Therefore SPINS [31] 
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node-to-node key sharing method is used here for key setup. Because the home server 
is regarded as a trusted machine, distributing keys between two communicating 
aggregators can be delegated to the home server.  
Assume that the child aggregator Ac wants to establish a secure connection 
with the parent aggregator Ap to deliver the aggregate data. Both aggregators share no 
keys, but both share keys with the home server (KAc and KAp) and trust it. The home 
server acts as a key distribution centre (KDC) to distribute the symmetric key KAc,Ap 
to both parties through the following protocol. 
1: Ac  Ap: NAc, Ac
2: Ap  H: NAc, NAp, Ac, AP, MAC(KAp, NAc| NAp| Ac| AP) 
3: H  Ac: E(KAc, KAc,Ap), MAC(KAcmac, NAc| Ap| E(KAc, KAc,Ap)) 
4: H  Ap: E(KAp, KAc,Ap), MAC(KApmac, NAp| Ac| E(KAp, KAc,Ap)) 
where NAc and Nap are two random numbers to ensure key freshness. KAc,Ap is the key 
to be shared between the two communicating aggregators. The keys used for 
encryption are different from those used in authentication (KAcmac and KApmac). In line 
2, MAC is added to prevent DOS attacks as the home server is made to answer only 
authenticated requests.   
The packet submitted in technique two looks like the following: 
Achild Aparent: Achild,1, E(KAenc,H, COUNT| Agg| Byzantine_count| 




4.4 Performance Evaluation 
 
This section provides an analysis to the performance of the proposed secure 
aggregation method. First it discusses the complexity of the algorithm in terms of the 
computations involved. Next, through simulation, it evaluates the procedure in terms 
of the three security metrics that are commonly used: successful detection rate, false 
positive rate, and accuracy improvement rate. Finally, it shows how much energy is 
expected to be saved.  
 
4.4.1 Algorithm Complexity 
 
GESD is the main component in our method and is run at the aggregators. In 
GESD, calculating the standard deviation, S, is the most time-consuming operation in 













Given n and r, the number of multiplications can be calculated. 
n + (n-1)+(n-2)+…+(n-r) 
In general, GESD time complexity is O(nr). 
The number of outlier measurements, r, is assumed to be n/2 at worst. Hence, 





4.4.2 Simulation Setup and Results 
 
The performance metric used in security analysis is the ability to detect 
malicious data with the existence of Byzantine nodes. The simulation scenario is set 
to calculate, specifically, the successful detection and false detection rates. By 
definition, the successful detection rate is the percentage of Byzantine nodes that can 
be detected. On the other hand, the false positive rate shows the percentage of the 
nodes that are reported Byzantine but are not. A third metric is the accuracy 
improvement rate. As the system excludes malicious data, measurement accuracy 
improves. Accuracy depends on the aggregation function in question; however, the 
accuracy improvement can be determined in terms of the deviation from the mean. 
In the simulation, a number of sensors are deployed in an area to perform a 
certain measurement to the same or correlated environmental events. The sensors 
report contaminated measurements with noise (N(0,1)) to a collection sensor, the 
aggregator. The scenario is simulated with one aggregator and 25 sensors (S1-S25), 
from which up to 7 sensors might become compromised at once (that is, 30% of the 
total number of sensors). The probability of attack, PA, is assumed 0.3 (β =0.82).The 
results are presented below. 
 
The Successful Detection Rate can be calculated as the number of detected 
Byzantine nodes over the real number of Byzantine nodes in the sensor network. 
There are hardly any undetected Byzantine nodes because the trust function keeps 
track of the nodes’ performance, and, accordingly, the associated trust value is 
updated. It is possible that a Byzantine node may operate while staying undetected for 
a few readings, but eventually, its trust value drops and it is marked Byzantine. As 
explained above, the trust values drop relatively fast as compared to growing. That 
makes the trust function fairly smart and thus effective. Figure  4-9 shows an example 
of three nodes. The red one (S25) is a Byzantine node that tries to hide by reporting 
good measurements at times and bad measurements at other times. Its trust value, 
though, drops below the threshold value after a period of time, while S1 and S10 
continue to improve their trustworthiness status. 
 





















Figure  4-9 Sensor Node Trust (β =0.8) 
 
 
Figure  4-10 demonstrates the result of trust values for every sensor. With PA 
equal to 0.3, Byzantine nodes S19-S25 were captured in approximately 45 to 50 
readings, a mixture of good and malicious ones.  
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Figure  4-10 Trust Result 
 
Obviously, Byzantine nodes can be captured faster with a higher probability of 
attack, PA. Probability of attack defines how risky the environment is in terms of the 
possibility of attacking the nodes and compromising them. With a higher PA, the 
system is more sensitive to malicious data and tends to punish misbehaving nodes 
faster (Equation 5 and Equation 6). Figure  4-11 shows that the Byzantine node S25 
was detected in 20 measurements, much faster than the case with Pa=0.3 (Figure  4-9). 
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Figure  4-11 Sensor Node Trust (β =0.58) 
 
The previous two diagrams do not consider the second threshold value, against 
which a sensor is assessed and, accordingly, can be excluded from the network. with 
inclusion of the second threshold, trust evaluation behaves differently. As Figure  4-12 
shows, when a sensor’s trust value drops below the first threshold value, cryptography 
is enforced on that sensor. If the drop of trust is due to an outside attack, then with 
cryptography on, the attack is mitigated and so the trust goes up again as in the case of 
S24. However, if cryptography does not seem to solve the problem as the trust 
continues to decrease reaching the second threshold value, the sensor is removed.  
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Figure  4-12 Trust After Enforcing Two Thresholds 
 
However, it is also of interest to look at the outlier detection algorithm 
(GESD) performance. Based on Figure  4-13, a number of observations can be made. 
The first point is linked to the number of Byzantine nodes. As more of them 
contribute to the collection of information, the detection rate decreases, due to the 
masking problem in outlier detection. The problem happens when malicious data is 
not detected because of the existence of other outliers. As seen in Figure  4-13, when 
there is only one Byzantine node, the detection rate is at 100%. By increasing the 
number of Byzantine nodes to 7, the success rate drops to 86% (deviation of up to 10) 
and 80% (deviation of up to 5). 
Second, looking at the figure from a different perspective, it can be concluded 
that the number of honest nodes have an influence on GESD. The detection rate 
improves with an increase of good nodes in the network. In the simulation, when the 
number of honest nodes is at 70% of the total number of nodes, the success rate is at 
80%. With the increase of good nodes to 93%, the success rate reaches 100%. 
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Third, as Byzantine node measurements fall further away from the true mean 
value, the outlier detection rate becomes better. As shown in Figure  4-13, the 
successful detection rate shows an improvement of over 10% when the curve that 
simulates nodes reporting measurements up to 5 standard deviations from the mean is 
compared with the curve whose nodes report measurement further away from the 
mean (~10 standard deviations). 
























Figure  4-13 GESD Successful Detection Rate 
 
The False Positive Rate can be calculated as the number of the nodes marked 
Byzantine mistakenly over the total number of good nodes in the system. From the 
simulation, results show that the false positive rate is zero. Figure  4-10 confirm that 
S1-S18 are good nodes and S19-S25 are Byzantine ones. However, as can be inferred 
from Figure  4-9 and Figure  
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4-10, although some of the sensor readings, such as S4, 
S10, and S15’s, have been identified as outliers on certain occasions, none of them is 
marked Byzantine. In fact, the reason for some measurements possibly being reported 
as outliers can be related to noise and/or the sensor’s position. As far as GESD is 
concerned, the false outlier detection rate is almost zero.     
 
 
The Accuracy Improvement Rate can be calculated in terms of the achieved 
improvement to the standard deviation using the following equation. 
 







where Sbad is the standard deviation with the existence of Byzantine nodes. 
Srobust is the standard deviation after filtering out the Byzantine nodes. 
Accuracy improvement is introduced mainly to prove the effectiveness of the 
GESD algorithm. As malicious data is excluded, the standard deviation becomes 
smaller, which improves the overall accuracy of the collected data. Figure  4-14 shows 
that up to 3 times the accuracy improvement can be gained when Byzantine nodes 
inject false data of up to 10 standard deviations.  




















Figure  4-14 Accuracy Improvement (with 7 Byzantine Nodes) 
 
However, the improvement rate is subject to the severity of malicious data. As 
Byzantine nodes report measurements that are further apart from other sensors 
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consensus, excluding those malicious data can significantly improve the accuracy 
improvement rate. Furthermore, as the number of Byzantine nodes increases, the 
accuracy improvement rate increases. Figure  4-15 proves those two points. As can be 
noticed, when the deviation from consensus is around 10, the improvement average 
reaches 1.2 and it reaches 0.4 for 5 deviated data.  



























Figure  4-15 GESD Accuracy Improvement Rate 
 
 
4.4.3 Energy Consumption 
 
One contribution in favour of our security scheme is the conservation of 
energy it makes. As has been shown in Chapter 3, cryptography causes considerable 
extra consumption of energy, mainly due to packet overhead, which leads 
consequently to a shorter network lifetime. Our method reduces the impact of 
cryptographic tools by postponing their use until an attack is suspected. More 
precisely, cryptography is switched on to only those sensors whose trustworthiness 
value is low. Thus, this method saves 14% to 20% of power dissipation on every 
packet transmitted. The exact amount of energy saved depends on the security 
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requirements, encryption and/or authentication, and the implemented cryptographic 
primitives, such as RC5, RC6, and DES.    
For a better idea of how much power is expected to be saved, this section 
shows the amount of energy consumed in the case of SPINS [14] and TinySec [32] 
security algorithms (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). Both of them build their security 
blocks on top of the TinySec operating system, which constructs packets of size 36 
bytes. 
SPINS adds zero bytes for encryption but adds 6 bytes to every packet for 
authentication. Table 3 demonstrates the costs of computation and communication in 
terms of energy. Most of the overhead is related to the transmission of the extra bytes 
rather than computations.  
 
Table 3 Energy Costs of Adding Security Protocols 
Packet Component Energy Consumption (%) 
Data Transmission 71 
Encryption Computation <1 
Encryption Transmission <1 
Freshness Computation <1 
Freshness Transmission 7 
MAC Computation 2 
MAC Transmission 20 
 
 
Table 4 lists the TinySec security options and the corresponding energy 
consumption that is related to packet transmission. As can be seen, authentication and 





Table 4 Radio Energy Costs 
Security Option # of Overhead Bytes Energy (mJ) Increase (%) 
No security - 1.215 - 
Authentication 1 1.247 2.6 
Authentication and 
encryption 
5 1.385 13.99 
  
Regarding the energy consumed on CPU processing, every cryptographic 
primitive requires a different amount of time and a different number of CPU cycles 
for execution, resulting in different energy consumption values. Table 5 and Table 6 
present the time, CPU cycles, and Energy consumed by ciphers and MAC algorithms. 
 
Table 5 Costs of Ciphers on CPU 
Algorithm Time(ms) CPU cycles Energy(µJ) 
SkipJack 2.16 15925.2 51.84 
RC5 1.50 11059.2 36.00 
DES 608.00 4,482,662.4 14,592.00 
 
Table 6 Costs of MAC on CPU 
Algorithm Time(ms) CPU cycles Energy(µJ) 
SkipJack 299 22,044.6 71.76 
RC5 2.08 15,335.4 49.92 
DES 1,208.00 8,906,342.4 28,992.00 
 
 
In conclusion, Power efficiency is an important aspect, which directly 
influences network lifetime. By making the security choice and looking at the tables 
above, the security designer can estimate the amount of energy to spend. In our 
security scheme, enabling cryptography is directly related to the trust value a sensor 
node has. When the trust value drops lower than a defined threshold value, security is 
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turned on immediately. Therefore, the following relation holds. By lowering the trust 
threshold value, sensors work without security for a longer time. As a result, the 
lifetime is extended, but security is relatively sacrificed. On the other hand, by raising 
the trust threshold value, sensor security is tightened, as sensors may start security 
earlier than in the previous case. This leads to a shorter lifetime but securer system. 
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5CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
5.1 Summary and Contributions 
 
Sensor networks promise viable solutions to many problems in a variety of 
fields. Sensing technology today is moving relatively fast from research contexts to 
industrial and social contexts, and with increased interest in implementing sensor 
networks, there comes a vital concern about data secrecy. Most applications, if not all, 
must be provided with security as an intrinsic. In addition, data aggregation 
techniques are highly desirable to prolong network lifetime and increase information 
accuracy.  
The motivation behind this thesis is to relax the conflict that applying security 
on sensor networks tends to compromise other important issues. First, Cryptographic 
tools cause extra consumption of energy. Second, cryptographic functions assume that 
nodes are trustworthy as long as they use the assigned secret keys. Third, end-to-end 
security prevents intermediate nodes from modifying message contents. 
Consequently, applying security does not allow data aggregation techniques to take 
place, deprives sensor networks of a long lifetime, and does not solve the inside attack 
problem. In spite of all that, security and data aggregation must both be implemented 
because they are vital for the success of sensor networks. In this context, this thesis 
addresses security issues in wireless sensor network, with a strong focus on secure 
data aggregation. A novel mechanism is proposed to achieve data aggregation while 
maintaining security requirements and preserving energy, even in the presence of 
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Byzantine nodes (inside attacks). In the proposed technique, the aggregator, in 
addition to performing the regular aggregation function, identifies the outlying sensor 
nodes through an outlier detection algorithm called Generalized Extreme Studentized 
Deviate (GESD). Furthermore, it assigns information-theory-derived trustworthiness 
values to all sensors to keep track of their performance. Trust values are checked 
against two threshold values. When a sensor’s trust is lower than the first threshold 
value, only then is cryptography enabled. When the value is lower than the second 
threshold, the sensor is assumed to be Byzantine and, therefore, it is excluded from 
the network.  
In other words, the described mechanism has two novel contributions: 1) 
cryptography is switched on only when an attack is suspected, which preserves the 
energy that otherwise would be needed to run the cryptographic functions. The format 
of packets with and without cryptographic fields is also discussed, showing that 14% 
to 20% of overhead per packet can be saved. 2) data aggregation continues to work, 
even more efficiently, as malicious data and Byzantine nodes are suppressed. 
Simulation results show that the outlier detection procedure is able to successfully 
detect outliers with a high rate of 80% to 100%, depending on the number of 
Byzantine nodes, and with hardly any false alarms. Furthermore, nodes can be 
detected as fast as in 20 to 50 readings, depending on the configurable parameter, 
probably of attack PA. 
However, it should be noted that the proposed mechanism has some 
limitations. Firstly, the maximum number of Byzantine nodes that this mechanism can 
simultaneously handle must be less than half of the total number of nodes.  Secondly, 
it assumes that aggregator nodes are trustworthy. Thus, for this mechanism to work 
efficiently, the aggregators must be provided with a higher level of security, such as 
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tamper-resistant packaging, and be placed in secure locations. Thirdly, a master key is 
used in deriving other keys for all sensors to use. This keying technique introduces a 
shortcoming: if the master key is compromised, then the whole network can be 
compromised.   
 
5.2 Future work 
 
The work presented in this thesis can still have various extensions and 
directions for future work. One of the future works is to add the aggregator node to 
the list of non-trustees. In this thesis, the aggregator is regarded as a trusted node, 
which satisfies many sensor network applications. However, it is also of interest to 
determine the aggregator’s honesty. For that, another mechanism should be added. 
Chapter 3 introduces some work done in this area, detecting a malicious aggregator. 
For example, Deng et al. [50] and Wu et al. [51] propose having watchdog-like nodes 
to monitor the aggregators. These techniques can be manipulated so that they 
integrate with my technique. Moreover, an interactive proof technique in which the 
home server ensures that the aggregator is not malicious is possible. That is, the home 
server investigates previous readings and assigns trust values to the aggregator based 
on them. 
 A second possible approach for extension is to implement multi-tiered 
security architecture. The proposed scheme assumes that cryptography is either on or 
off. With multi-tiered security design, different levels of security can be maintained. 
Every security level can be triggered in accordance with the trust assessment. For 
example, security can be set to the minimum when the trust value is high, but as the 
trust value slides down, a certain level of security is enforced. Moreover, when the 
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number of Byzantine nodes increases, all sensors are forced to increase their security 
level. By offering a range of security levels, the limited sensor resources are better 
utilized according to the required protection level and severity of the threat. This 
approach requires studying the cryptographic primitives to select the ones that satisfy 
the goal. A preliminary survey shows that RC5 and RC6 are possible candidates as 
they are fully parameterized.  
To summarize, security protocols and data aggregation techniques seem to 
introduce conflicts; however, integrating them both is essential for the success of a 
sensor network. The results of this thesis provide a good starting point for a deeper 
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